March, 1940

University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania Law
School Copyright 1940, by the University of Pennsylvania

$4-50

FOREIGN,

PER ANNUM

$5.oo

CURRENT COPIES, 75 CENTS

BOARD OF EDITORS
THEODORE 0. ROGERS, Editor-InChelf

ROBERT W. SAYRE,

A. O'BoYLE, Case Editor
WILLIAM B. MARSHALL, Secretary

LEWIS WEINSTOCK,

THOMAS

Managing Editor
Legislation and Note

Editor
MITCEFTL E. PANZER, Book Review Editor

H. FRANCIS DELONE
G. FRED DIBONA
RICHARD M. DICxE

EDWARD M. DAVID

RICHARD S. FARRELL
CHESTER C.

-AILINSKI

SIDNEY W. FRICX

WILLIAMx T. LEITH

JOSEPH K. GILLIGAN

PETER P. LIEBERT, III

ANDREW HOURIGAN, JR.

WILLIAM E. LINDENMUTH

ERWIN LERTEN

SAMUEL S. LOGAN, JR.

ANDERSON PAGE

JOHN R. MCCONNELL

EDWIN P. ROMEJ

LIPmAN REDIAN

MILTON H. SHAPIRO

GEORGE B. Ross

HERBERT WORONOF7

BERNARD

DAVID M. BANE

JOHN L. SPURGEON

MARVIN COMISKY

3.

SMOLENS

JOHN M. STOCKER
ROY J. WAYCHOFF, JR.

Correspondence concerned with editorial matters should be directed to the EDITORIN-CHIEF'; address business inquiries to the SECRETARY.

NOTES
Regulation of Investment Companies
Until the Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,1 the first section of which
was submitted to the Congress on June io,1938, most of the literature
on the subject had been either descriptive or promotional. 2 And it is
I. Hereinafter referred to as "REPORT".
will hereinafter be referred to as "SEC.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

2. See generally: FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONG (I93I); FoWILER,
AMERICAN INVESTMENT TRUSTS (928);
GRAYSON, INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1931);
HARWOOD AND BLAIR, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND FUNDS FROM THE INVESTOR!S POINT

OF Vi-W

(3d ed. 1938)

; OTTINGER AN) SHEA, INVESTMENT TRusTs-A SURVEY o1 THE

(584)

NOTES

singular that although the investment company industry was more than
one-third the size of life insurance companies, one-half the size of savings
banks, and almost as large as building and loan associations, 8 its development 4 and activities have been practically unattended by federal governmental supervision or effective local statutory restraint. The present
indications, however, are that the ring of federal "investor-protection"
statutes, begun in 1933 with the Securities Act, 5 and strengthened almost
annually thereafter with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of I935, 7 Chapter X of the Chandler Act,"
the Maloney Act of 1938,9 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,10 will
be widened, during this or the next session of the Congress, by some form
of regulation of investment companies.
The two most obvious examples of institutions dealing primarily with
the public's funds which are subject to specific public administrative control are banks and insurance companies. Even those states whose general incorporation laws are the most free have long imposed safeguards
around these monied institutions.11 Banks may not be organized unless
an investigation reveals that "the convenience and advantage of the public will be served by the proposed incorporation", that there is a "reasonable promise of adequate support for the enterprise", that "the responsibility, character and general fitness for the business of the incorporators,
directors, and officers . . . are such as to command the confidence of
the community and to warrant the belief that the business . . . will be
honestly and efficiently conducted". 12 Other prevalent statutory proviACTMTIES AND FORMS OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS WITH RECOMMENDATION FOR STATUTORY REGULATION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, NEW YORK (1927); ROBINSON,
INVESTMENT TRUST ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (rev. ed. I929); SPEAKER, THE
INVESTMENT TRUST (I924); STEINER, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AMEmcAN EXPERIENCE
(1929); WILLIAMS, INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN AmmucA (1928); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS OF THE NATIONAL ASSociAToN OF SEcURrIEs COMMISSIONERS (1929); SEN. REP. No. I455, 73d Cong., ist Sess. (1934) 333 et seq.;

Shaviro, The Regulation of Investment Companies: What the S. E. C. Will Probably
Recommend (936) 48 ANNALIST 454; Legis. (1930) 44 H. v. L. REv. 117; Note
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1211.
3.STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (936) 243, 257, 282.
4. Although investment companies were firmly established in Great Britain by the
1870s, the principal obstacle to their growth in the United States was not removed until
z888 when New Jersey became the first state to permit generally a corporation to own
the securities of another corporation. By 1921 only 40 such companies had appeared,
but in the next six years 139 companies were formed and "by 1929 investment companies
were literally being formed at the rate of almost one each business day." REPORT,
Part 3, c. I, p. 3. Of more than 1200 companies known to have been created in the
United States only 588 were still active at the end of 1936.
Yearly sales of the security issues of investment companies rose from approximately
$4oo,ooo,ooo in 1927 to more than $3,ooooooooo in 1929. Assets which totalled approximately $700,ooo,ooo in 1926 reached an estimated peak market value of over $8,ooo,ooo,ooo before the crash in 1929. The decline which followed was as precipitate.
5. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), I5 U. S. C. A. § 77a (Supp. 1939).
6. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), I5 U. S. C. A. § 78a (Supp. I939).
7. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), I5 U. S. C. A. § 79 (Supp. 1939).
8. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), I1 U. S. C. A. § 5o1 (I939).
9. 52 STAT. 1070 (938), I5 U. S. C. A. § 78o-3 (Supp. 1939).
10. 53 STAT. 1149 (I939), I5 U. S. C. A. § 77aaa (Supp. 1939).
ii. Of the 740 investment companies in existence "at some time in the period from
1927 to 1935", 636 were incorporated in Delaware, New York, Maryland and Massachusetts; 377 companies were Delaware corporations. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 16q, n. 9.
12. The quotations are from the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1939) tit. 7, § 819-3o6. Similar provisions are, however, to be found in: I MD. ANN.
CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. I, §§22,43; N. Y. BANKNG LAW,§23. The Delaware and
Massachusetts statutes are less explicit: DEL. Rrv. CODE (1935) c. 66; 2 MASS. GEN.
LAWS (1932) §§ I67, 168, 170.
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sions require a specific capital contribution by incorporators and directors,
a fiduciary's oath by directors, the bonding of those officials who handle
funds, frequent examination by and reports to state officials, and the deposit
of securities of a certain amount or value with the state. Closely comparable restrictions have been set up for insurance companies.' 3 Moreover, those who invest their money in banks, the depositors, are given
creditor status generally senior in order of distribution to other creditors,
and the federal government has even gone to the length of instituting a
system of deposit insurance. 14
Such regulations and protective measures are now regarded as necessary commonplaces. That banks and insurance companies have apparently
prospered under and been strengthened by regulation is a good omen for the
investment company industry under the prospective legislation.
The purpose of this note is to discuss the aspects of the subject which
will probably be covered by the future investment company act.

I.

THE DEFINITION OF "INVESTMENT COMPANY" AND EXEMPTIONS FROM
THaE ACT
Probably the most difficult as well as one of the most important tasks
confronting the draftsmen of the proposed act is the formulation of an effective and flexible definition of "investment company". 1 5 The favorable
experience of the SEC with the definition of "holding company" under
the Holding Company Act' 8 should prove a material aid in the solution
of this problem.
"Securities companies" is the all-inclusive term covering those organizations whose general activity is dealing in securities, but the investment company should properly fall into a narrower class because it is a
particular type of securities corporation. The "more precise formula" m
utilized by the SEC is stated in its Report as follows:
"A securities company was deemed to be an investment company if
more than one-half of its assets, other than cash and United States
government securities, consisted of securities other than United States
government securities and securities of subsidiary companies which
were not investment companies. The term 'subsidiaries' was restricted
to companies of which more than 5o% of the voting shares was
owned or controlled by the organization." 's
13. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) C. 2o; i MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 48A; 2
MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 175; N. Y. INS. LAW; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O)
tit. 40.

14. 48 STAT. I68 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (1936). For a resum6 of the work
of the FDIC in 1939 see N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1940, p. 25, col. 1.
15. The usual textbook definition of an investment company is that it is one whose
primary function is to invest its funds in a diversified portfolio of securities without
exercising any control or influence over its portfolio corporations. Such a definition is
inadequate since it excludes, for instance, any company which does exercise control or
influence, the element of control not being always incompatible with an investment
company. Moreover, as the SEC points out, the vagueness of the terms used creates
the practically insoluble problem of "determining the extent of trading necessary to
make a securities company an investment company and the intent with which the securities of portfolio corporations were acquired." REPORT, Part i, p. 21.
16. 49 STAT. 804 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79 (b) (a) (7) (Supp. 1939).
17. REPORT, Part I, p. 22.
18. Ibid. ". . . the determinatiorV of the percentage of assets invested in subsidiary companies was on the basis of an unconsolidated statement. However, where
the nature of the company was more accurately reflected by a consolidated statement of
the parent and its subsidiaries, such consolidated basis was used." Id. at n. ii.
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Even this definition, however, "presumptively" omitted (i) "securities
companies with investments primarily in wholly-owned subsidiaries", and
(2) "securities companies with investments primarily in non-whollyowned subsidiaries." 19
It is suggested that for purposes of legislation the SEC's definition
should be broadened because the propriety of such omission is questionable. In addition, the broader definition would give greater scope to and
more fully effectuate the purposes of the act. As in the Holding Company Act, however, there could be exemption upon application to and
order of the SEC, if:
(i) such investment company is intrastate in character, selling or
offering for sale its securities solely within the state in which
it is organized.
(2) such investment company is only incidentally an investment company, being primarily engaged or interested in one or more businesses other than the business of an investment company...
(3) such investment company is only temporarily an investment
company ....
(4) such investment company is not, and derives no material part of
its income from any subsidiary which is, a company the principal
business of which
20 within the United States is that of an investment company.
In addition, as in the Securities Act, there could be self-executing exemptions, 2 ' the more important of which would make clear that the act does
not cover banks, building and loan associations, insurance companies, companies subject to the Holding Company Act, personal holding companies,
mortgage guaranty companies, school districts, municipalities and other
governmental units, and organizations operated exclusively for religious,
educational or charitable purposes.
The question then seems to resolve into what percentage of assets
invested in portfolio securities-for security holding is "the common denominator" 2 2 of all securities companies-shall identify a company as
an investment company. The answer will probably be reached by a compromise effected by the statutory draftsmen and the spokesmen for the
industry.
Using tools furnished by the SEC, the writer ventures a definition
which would both delimit the general field of activity, identifying a securities corporation, and yet fix a minimum percentage of assets in securities, thereby creating a "physical condition" test which would single out
an "investment company".
ig. Id. at 23. The SEC more fully describes the companies in (i) and (2). The
former are companies "whose assets consist exclusively, or almost exclusively, of securities of one or more wholly-owned or substantially wholly-owned corporations ...
The parent company has absolute control over its portfolio corporations-its subsidiaries-and these subsidiaries do not differ, in essence, from operating divisions or units
within a single organization. . . . These parent securities companies, if the legal fiction of distinct corporate entity be disregarded, may in essence be deemed to be engaged
in the business of its portfolio corporations." Id. at 18.
The latter are companies "whose assets consist primarily of investments in securities of one or more corporations in each of which the securities company owns 5o% or
more but less than ioo% of the outstanding voting shares, an amount sufficient to insure
absolute control under ordinary circumstances." I& at 1g.
20. Cf. 49 STAT. 81o (i935), i5 U. S. C. A. §79c (Supp. 1939).
2L 48 STAT. 75 (i933), 15 U. S. C. A. §77c (Supp. 1939).
22. REPoRT, Part I, p. 22.
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"Investment company" means any corporation which is engaged,
either directly or through subsidiaries, primarily in the business of owning securities of other corporations, or in the business of investing and
re-investing, or trading, for the purpose of revenue and for profit, in
securities, purchased with funds raised by the sale publicly of its own
securities, more than I0 per cent. of the assets of which, other than
cash and United States government securities, (provided said IO per
cent. is $ioo,ooo or over) shall consist of securities, other than United
States government securities and securities of affiliates which are not
investment companies.
The IO per cent. figure suggested has several merits: it would serve to prevent evasion of regulation by perversion of portfolio policies; itis sufficiently large ($ioo,ooo or over) to admit of cognizable public investor interest; it will serve to place the burden of obtaining exemption on those
companies which claim to be without the purview of the act; and it will
broaden the coverage of the act by reaching those companies regulation of
which should clearly be the very purpose of the legislation.
II.

THE

CREATION OF INVESTMENT

COMPANIES

A. Spoisors or Promoters
The abuses which appeared from the SEC's investigation of this phase
of the industry have included the promiscuous creation of investment companies where no economic need for them existed; 2 the frequent lack of
ability and experience on the part of sponsors or promoters of companies
the chief appeal of which lay in the promise of expert security analysis
and investment management; 24 conflicts of interest in the sponsors, especially in the predominant groups of investment bankers, brokers, security

dealers, and other professional financing groups;
to make adequate disclosure to investors;

27

25

self-dealing;

21 failure

complete and arbitrary con-

23. The Continental Chicago Corporation raised a net capital of $63,750,000, although at the time The Chicago Corporation, sponsored by the same investment bankers,
was unable to find investment opportunities for its $59,375,000 of capital funds. REPoRT, Part 3, c. III, p. ioi. The sponsors received a gross underwriting fee of $2,625,0oo.
24. REPORT, Part 3, c. I, p. 3. The statistics of the SEC indicate that generally the
performance of closed-end and opened-end investment companies "was virtually identical
with the go common stock index" which is made up of "unmanaged" securities. REPORT, Part 2, c. VI. (Note, however, the limitations on these statistics cited in the

REPORT.)
25. This abuse has been recognized as such by prominent members of the industry.
See for example the statements of Mr. Louis G. Kaufman and Col. Samuel McRoberts
in connection with Chatham Phenix Allied Corporation, REPORT, Part 3, c. II, pp. 113114; Mr. Philip R. Clarke and Mr. Henry M. Dawes in connection with CentralIllinois Securities Corporation, id. at 124-125, 169-173; Mr. Elisha Walker in connection with the Petroleum Corporation of America, id. at 266-267, 337; Mr. Gerald Beal
in connection with Continental Securities Corporation, id. at 422-423. These are only
a few of the many such statements made in the course of the investigation. See also
the statement by the SEC, REPORT, Part I, p. 74.
26. "While the losses in a number of investment companies were attributable principally to the security market decline and general business decline, in many cases the
substantial losses sustained by investment companies were the'result of the numerous
transactions which the sponsors, managers, officers, directors and other controlling interests effected for their own account with the investment companies which they dominated." REPORT, Part 3, c. I, pp. 27-28.
27. Thus, for example, "nothing in the charter of Petroleum Corporation of America or in the public announcements which accompanied the issuance and distribution of
its stock even remotely indicated that the corporation was intended as a vehicle for
advancing the plans of Sinclair and his banking associates to consolidate various oil
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trol over the financial and capital structure; 2s failure by the sponsors to
make capital contributions commensurate with the position and interests
they obtained in the enterprise; 29 failure by the sponsors to assume and
live up to their fiduciary duties; and excessive compensation. 81
The initial problem becomes one of co-ordination of the spheres of
state and federal activities in regulating the creation of these companies.
In the absence of a federal incorporation act, the possibility of which has
been held remote,3 2 "there seems to be no reason . . . why Congress
cannot require all corporations desiring to engage in interstate commerce
to subject themselves to some degree of federal regulation by obtaining a
federal license." 8 Therefore a specific investment company licensing
provision could be spelled4 out in language comparable to that in Section
5 of the Securities Act:3
Unless a certificate of approval has been obtained from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, it shall be unlawful for any
investment company to utilize the facilities of interstate commerce.
This certificate of approval, or federal license, should be issued in the
case of new investment companies only upon the satisfactory conclusion
of an extensive investigation into the economic demand for and prospects
of the company; affiliations of the sponsors; the capital contributions
made by them; their interests in any property being acquired by the company; and the compensation, its amount and form, being received by
them. Even the personal records and experience of the sponsors may
well be investigated, just as in the radio broadcasting field.39 The sponsors should be required further to make an affidavit that the company
was being formed in good faith and in compliance with all the rules and
regulations which the SEC should have power to prescribe. Adequate
disclosure of material facts to investors may also well be prescribed.
Explicit, of course, in such statutory regulation should be the essential requirement that conflicting interests be segregated. This would necescompanies into one large unit dominated by the Sinclair interests." REPORT, Part 3,
c. II, p. 285. "The name of Sinclair never appeared either as officer or director" until
three years after the corporation was formed. Ibid.
28. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 30.
29. Dillon, Read & Co., for example, the sponsor of United States & Foreign Securities Corporation, invested $5,IOO,OOO in that company in comparison with the public's contribution of $25,ooo,ooo. The public had a first lien on the company's assets to
that extent, and a right to 25% of the voting power and surplus profits. The sponsor
which had contributed 16.9% of the capital received, inter alia, 75% of the voting power
and a right to 75% of the surplus profits. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 35. Within approximately four years, the block of common stock held by the sponsor had an unrealized
appreciation of io,9oo%. Ibid.
30. See VI, Shifts in Control, infra p.6o7.
3X. Although the security holders had lost within four years time approximately
5o% of the capital they had contributed to the Federated Capital Corporation, the sponsor and his controlled companies had "received in salaries, selling commissions, and
management fees a total of $286,327.73." REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 307. See also the
discussion of the Continental Chicago Corporation, note 23 supra, and of Mr. Wallace
Groves, REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 231.

32. Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation (1936) 49 HAzv. L.
REV. 396, 413-422. Cf. Watkins, Federalizationof Corporations (1935) 13 TENN. L.

REv.89.

33. Berlack, note 32 supra, at 409.
34. 48 STAT. 77 (933), 15 U. S.C.A. § 77e (Supp. 1939).
35. Federal Communications Act,48 STAT. 1084, i089 (1934), 47 U. S.C.A. §§ 308,
319 (Supp. 1939). See particularly Application to Transfer Control of Corporation
Holding Radio Broadcast Construction Permit or License, FCC Form No. 315, Dec.
1938; Application for Standard Broadcast Station Construction Permit or Modification
Thereof, FCC Form No. 30I, rev. July 1939.
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sitate the declaration that no investment banker, broker, or dealer could
act as sponsor of an investment company. And to prevent pyramiding,
one investment company should be prevented from sponsoring another.3 6
Some doubt has been expressed 3 7 as to the powers of Congress to
regulate the corporate structure and internal affairs of state corporations
licensed to engage in interstate commerce, but respectable authority has
long since banished such doubt."' The SEC's Report strongly demonstrates the pressing public necessity for supervision and control.39 It
should need little further buttressing to clinch the view that, in the investment company field, "Congress should have the power to protect
the na40
tional commerce by any means appropriate to the purpose."

B. Directors
The abuses in relation to directors have included the use of important
names as "fronts" and "window-dressing"; 41 failure to disclose those
actually in control of the company; 42 failure by directors to make adequate capital contributions;" conflicts of interests and self-dealing; 44 the
use of charter and by-law clauses sanctioning conflicts of interest and
enabling ratification of all acts of the directors in the absence of fraud; 45
36. Compare the segregation provisions under the Banking Act of 1933, 48

STAT.

188, 189 (I933), 12 U. S. C. A. §§ 377, 378 (1936). See also the similar provision of the
Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 830 (935), I5 U. S. C. A. § 79 (q) (c) (Supp. 1939).

37. Berlack, note 32 supra, at 4o9 et seq. The "reconstruction" of the Supreme
Court may have changed this attitude.
38. Morawetz, The Power of Congress to Enact IncorporationLaws and to Regulate Corporations (1913) 26 HAR.

L. Rav. 667, 68o-68i.

39. Such legislation "would be based upon the theory that a corporate organization
is but a means of transacting commerce, and that under its power to regulate interstate
and international commerce Congress can prohibit the transaction of such commerce by
means of any corporate organization which in its opinion is unsafe or otherwise prejudicial to the interstate commerce of the public." Id. at 682.
40. Berlack, note 32 supra, at 411. See also Willis, Corporations and the United
States Constitution (1934) 8 U. OF CIx. L. REv. i, 19.
41. Mr. Walter P. Chrysler was a director of the United States & Foreign Securities Corporation, although he attended only one meeting out of the 28 held during his
two years on the board. REPORT, Part 3, c. III, p. 117. Several titled Englishmen
and other prominent men were directors of Federated Capital Corporation although
they rarely, if ever, attended meetings. Id. at 118. Mr. Charles F. Kettering was apparently elected to the board of Yosemite Holding Corporation without his knowledge
or consent. Id. at 119. The American Capital group of investment companies "pursued the consistent policy of securing men of local or national prominence to comprise
the several management groups." Id. at 120. See especially the "advisory board" and
the "economic council" of the Investment Company of America. Id. at 121 et seq.
42. See note 27 .supra.
43. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, pp. 32-82.
44. The history of almost any one of the investment companies will illustrate such
abuses, but see especially Central-Illinois Securities Corporation which suffered losses
of approximately 49% of its original $15,000,000 capital and whose difficulties arose
largely from the conflicts of interest with its sponsors. REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 121 et
seq. The Petroleum Corporation of America, which within six years suffered a loss
of over $54,oo,ooo largely through ventures undertaken at "the dictation of its dominant influences", was the source of "tangible cash benefits in excess of $i8,ooo,ooo" for
this same dominant group. REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 233 et seq.
45. The certificate of incorporation of Central-Illinois Securities Corporation contained the following provision:
"In case the corporation enters into contracts or transacts business with one
or more of its directors, or with any firm of which one or more of its directors are
members, or with any other corporation or association of which one or more of its
directors are stockholders, directors or officers, such contract or transaction shall
not be invalidated or in any way affected by the fact that such director or directors
have or may have interests therein which are or might be adverse to the interests
of this corporation; provided that such contract or transaction is entered into in
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a stagger system of electing directors to perpetuate control; 4 seriatim
resignations as a device48 to shift control; 4 - and lack of minority representation on the board.

Such abuses naturally bring up the entire problem of "directors
who do not direct" 49 but certain prophylactic measures would seem
to be peculiarly applicable to investment companies. The legislation
should seek to give the security holder "as a matter of law" " something
"more than the loose expectation that a group of men under a nominal
duty to run the enterprise for his benefit and that of others like him, will
actually observe this obligation." 51 This can be accomplished by imposing express statutory fiduciary duty on all directors to the security holders
as well as to the entity. r2 Directors should also be required to take an
oath honestly and diligently to perform their duties without violating the
act or permitting it to be violated. 53 Together with the signed affidavit
to such effect should be a verification that the director meets all the statutory or administrative standards imposed on investment company directors.
As in the case of sponsors, investment bankers, brokers, or dealers
should be prohibited from being directors of investment companies because of the practically inevitable conflicts of interest that arise.5 4
There should be set up in addition a minimum requirement for capital contribution by directors, based preferably on some administrative
yardstick perhaps dependent on the amount of authorized, offered or sold
securities. Shift in ownership of securities should cause- disqualification
as should failure to attend meetings for a specified period of time, such as
good faith and authorized or ratified in the usual course of business as may be provided for in the by-laws of the Corporation." REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 126.
The prospective investors of Iroquois Share Corporation were never informed of a
similar provision inserted in a management contract executed by its dummy directors
vith the sponsor. REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 9.Dr. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 242,
takes the view that such clauses were to prevent abuse by directors.
46. By this means directors are divided into groups or classes, only one of which is
elected at each annual meeting. Consequently more than one annual meeting may be
necessary in order to bring about a change in the majority of the board. The by-laws
of Oils & Industries, Inc., and of Tri-Continental Corporation contained such provisions.
The boards of both companies could also fill vacancies provided by the increase in their
membership. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 370.
47. This practice arose out of the power of the boards of directors to fill vacancies
occurring between annual meetings. Thus an old director would resign and a new one
be elected and this process continued until a new board was created. Since this happened between annual meetings, the shareholders were ignorant of this change in their
board. This device was extensively used by, among others, Mr. Wallace Groves in acquiring four investment companies, REPORT, Part 3, c. II, § 6; by the Northern Fiscal
Group in the acquisition of three companies, id. at § 9; and by the Fiscal Management
Group in the acquisition of three companies, ibid.
48. One of the very few instances of minority representation was found in Insuranshares Corporation of Delaware. When the minority directors protested about some
practices, however, "all transactions . . . were approved by the investment committee of the company" whose meetings were so arranged that the minority member
"never quite got" to them until they were over. REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 227, n. 733.
49. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (I934) 47 HAuv. L. REV. 1305.
50. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)

277.
51. Ibid.

52. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE

(1928) 176 et seq.

53. Compare the oath required of directors of national banks. 43 STAT. 955 (1925),
12 U. S. C. A. § 73 (1936).
54. HARWOOD AND BLAIR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 39, take the contrary view on the
ground of practicability. Any one interested or primarily engaged in the sale of securities may not at the same time serve as an officer, director or employee of a national
bank. 49 STAT. 709 (1935), 12 U. S. C. A. § 78 (1936).
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six months.5 5 Moreover, seriatim resignations by directors, which have
resulted in secret shifts of control, and the stagger system of electing directors, which has perpetuated control, should be outlawed, while the
power of the board to fill interim vacancies should be restricted, perhaps
as in the New York Banking Law, to one-third of its number.' 6 Similarly, the directors should be denied the power to fill positions resulting
from an increase in their' number.
To protect the minority security holders and to narrow the gap between "ownership" and "control", a provision for minority representation
on the board may well be considered and perhaps included. Mandatory
5 7
And
cumulative voting has already proved helpful in bringing this about.
needless to say, full disclosure must be required to be made to security
holders of the affiliations and backgrounds of incumbent directors and
those to be elected.
Other general problems for legislative consideration are the bonding
of those officials handling the funds or negotiable securities of the company; prohibitions against the use of the "over-all" sanctioning clauses
referred to above, and against dealings between the company and the directors in their individual capacities. Similarly, any profit made by the
directors from the use of their inside information should be recoverable
by the corporation.5" This realistically should mean a prohibition of
emoluments and patronage and the forbidding of the acceptance by directors of any fees, commissions or gifts from others for their obtaining
from the investment company loans, investments, underwriting business,
or the like. To compensate for the abolition of what might hitherto have

been considered legitimate fields for directors' activities, consideration
should be given to the suggestion that yearly salaries be fixed instead of
the customary nominal attendance fee.
At least some restrictions on the powers of directors over the portfolio are in order. Such statutory limitations should, in effect, make all
investment companies semi-fixed in character, and, in furtherance of the
true corporate purpose of investment companies, prevent directors from
pledging portfolio securities to buy control of other companies " or from
otherwise failing to maintain the type of diversified portfolio on the strength
of which the public invested its funds.
Another protective measure is embodied in the suggestion that the
and dignity of
internal accountants of the company be raised to the rank
60
director with its resultant duties and responsibilities.
55. Most banking acts have such a provision: 49 STAT. 704, 708 (1935), 12 U. S.
C. A. § 71a (1936); i CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § io; DE. REv. CODE
(1935) c. 66, § 48; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. ii, § 26; 2 MAss. GEN. LAws
(1932) c. 172, § 14; N. Y. BANKING LAW, § 116; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit
7, § 8ig-5o2.
56. N. Y. BANKING LAW, § 119.
57. See Douglas, note 49 .upra, at 1330.
58. There is such a provision embodied in the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 830 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 (q) (b) (Supp. 1939) ; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 491, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78 (p) (b) (Supp. 1939). See
also Yourd, Trading in Securities by Insiders (1939) 38 MICH. L. REV. 133.
59. General Empire Corporation liquidated a large portion of its portfolio to secure
funds to lend to its parent, Atlas Corporation, to acquire control of Chatham Phenix
Allied Corporation. REVORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 156. In a little more than a year's time
Insuranshares Corporation of Delaware liquidated practically its entire portfolio realizing a loss of almost $i2,ooo,ooo based on the cost of those securities.

The $4,5oooo

cash proceeds were used to further the plans of its dominant group in gaining control
of other companies. Id. at 222. See also the discussion of the "purchase of control with
the acquired company's funds", id. at 379.
6o. Cf. REroaR, Part 3, c. II, p. 56.

NOTES
C. The Corporate Purpose

The essential idea behind an investment company proper is that it
is a device whereby many investors can pool their funds to obtain equally
the benefits of diversification of risk and expert management. In practice, however, this was not always true. In many cases the failure to
maintain a diversified portfolio developed out of the conflicts of interests
and self-dealing on the part of sponsors and directors resulting in the
company's portfolio being loaded with the securities of affiliated or "system" companies. 6 ' In some instances the company was used to sponsor
other investment companies 62 or as a device to gain control over a phase
of industry or finance,63 thus subordinating the investment expectation,
of the security holders to the desires of the insiders. In few cases was
adequate disclosure made to the public investors
prior to these shifts in
4
investment policy or corporate purpose.
The conflicts of interests also manifested themselves in other malpractices. The creation of investment companies was frequently induced
by the desire to obtain profits from the underwriting and security business
incident thereto.65 Since the sponsors were more interested in this profit,
they consequently paid less attention both to the management of the portfolio and the interests of the security holders. Moreover, when the collapse of the market occurred, the investment company was not infrequently used to bail out its sponsors, as a dumping ground for poor investments, or as a device to bolster a falling market, with resultant detriment to its own security holders. 66
To prevent the recurrence of such abuses, the legislation should require a clear statement of the corporate purpose. If that purpose is to
be investment in a diversified portfolio, within the definition suggested
above, then the words "investment company" should be included in the
corporate name. All other corporations should be enjoined from using
names giving the impression they are investment companies. The literature of the company should contain a statement that a company is
organized under and in accordance with the act. Perhaps the act should
confer power on the SEC to regulate by rule or order the types and
amounts of particular securities that may be held, and even the percentage
of industry diversification allowable. At least annual, and possibly more
frequent reports to investors should be required disclosing the percentage
of the company's holdings in the various securities, and whether and to
what extent the portfolio securities are in affiliated or "system" com6i. The most amazing example of this practice is the experience of Eastern Utilities Investing Corporation under the domination and control of Mr. H. C. Hopson
and the Associated Gas and Electric Company. REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 727 et Seq.
62. Dillon, Read &Co. and United States & Foreign Securities Corporation jointly
sponsored United States & International Securities Corporation, thereby enabling Dillon, Read & Co. to obtain "control over a fund twice as large as that of the original
company without the investment of any additional capital of its own." RZPoRT, Part 3,
c. V, p. 38. J. & W. Seligman & Co. sponsored Tri-Continental Corporation receiving
a gross underwriting commission of $3,ooo,ooo. The sponsor and the investment company then jointly sponsored Tri-Continental Allied Corporation. In raising this second $5o,ooo,ooo of capital J. & W. Seligman & Co. received a gross underwriting commission of $7,0ooooo. REPORT, Part 3, c. III, pp. 104-105.
63. See note 27 supra.
64. On the contrary, in the case of Eastern Utilities Investing Corporation representations were made as to the diversification of its portfolio at a time when over 9o%
of its investments were in the securities of the Associated Gas & Electric system. REroa, Part 3, c. II, p. 796. See also VI, Shifts in Control, infra p. 6o7.
65. REPoRT, Part 3, c. I, p. 3.
66. Id. at 28.
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be a physical check of the portfolio
panies. Necessary, of course, 6would
7
by an independent accountant.
The restrictions discussed in the section on Directors to be placed
upon their powers over the portfolio will help to maintain the diversity
of investment. The other suggested provisions seeking to abolish the
conflicts of interest in sponsors and directors will also prevent the use
of the investment company for personal ends. Furthermore the legislation should contain an affirmative provision requiring a high percentage
of security holders' approval of a charter amendment to change the corporate purpose. Such amendment, like any other amendment to the certificate of incorporation, should be fully publicized and, in addition, subject
to the prior approval of the SEC.
In addition to the previously mentioned prohibition against the pledge
of assets, a restriction that loans to a particular corporation or individual
shall not exceed a stated percentage of the unimpaired capital of the company would also tend to preserve the basic function of the company and
maintain the necessary liquidity of assets. Moreover, some limitation,
both as to amount and period of holding, should be put upon the company's dealings in its own securities since extensive operations of this
kind may pervert the corporate purpose and, as will be seen,6 react in
other ways to the detriment of the security holders.
Finally, whenever an investment company offers its securities on the
market, whether its original or a subsequent issue, full disclosure should
be made of the specific purpose and the amounts to be devoted thereto for
which
the security offered is to supply the fund, just as in the Securities
69
Act.
D. The Capital Structure
The capital structure 70 of investment companies was largely the result
of defects in the industry, but in turn it spawned still other abuses. To
begin with, the sponsors had complete control over the original capital
set-up 7 1 -frequently with disastrous results. By utilizing the multiplesecurity structure involving more than one outstanding class of securities,
sponsors were enabled to obtain immediate and prospective control of a
2
large pool of public funds for a relatively small capital contribution."
And, by taking equity securities rather than senior securities, the sponsors
were in a position to receive the major portion of the profits of the company.73 If the company subsequently suffered reverses forcing the senior
67. "The accountant's failure to check physically the possession of the portfolio
securities of the investment companies enabled the sponsor to conceal its conversion of
these securities." REPoRT, Part 3, c. I, p. 57, on Seaboard Utilities Shares Corporation, Railroad Shares Corporation and Utilities Hydro & Rail Shares Corporation.
68. See IV, The Repurchase of Securities, infra p. 6o2.
69. 48 STAT. 88 (1933), I5 U. S. C. A. § 77aa (Supp. 1939).
. the capital structure discloses the type or types of claims and the nature
70. ".
of the participating interests which the company has conferred upon the holders of its
various securities." REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 2.
"The 'capital' or 'capitalization' of an investment trust or investment company is
the fund raised by the trust or company to devote to the purpose for which the trust or
company has been formed." Ibid.
71. REPoRT, Part 3, c. V, p. 30.
72. See note 29 mipra.

73. Ibid. "Since both bonds and preference stocks have rights to earnings and
assets of the company superior to the common stock, the term 'senior securities' is employed to distinguish both of these classes from the common stock. Common stocks,
on the other hand, which have deferred claims to income and the assets of the company, are frequently termed 'junior securities'. Common stocks are frequently termed
'equity securities' in contradistinction to the 'senior' securities which have no share in
the residual earnings or assets of the company." REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 13.

NOTES

securities "under water" and leaving the equity securities with no asset
value, the sponsors were still able to benefit themselves. Because their
block of common stock carried the control with it, the sponsors could sell
it at a great premium thereby retrieving their own investment but leaving
the remaining security holders, who never heard about the transaction till
after its consummation, in the hands of a new controlling group which
usually had designs of its own.7 4
Since the contribution received by the company for its equity securities acts as a protective cushion for the senior securities, the amount of
that contribution is important. In theory, the senior security holder gives
up his right to an unlimited participation in the profits in return for this
protection. And yet as a result of the small contribution made by the
sponsors for the equity securities the protective cushion was totally inadequate, very often from the inception of the company.7 5 Furthermore, as
a direct outgrowth of the small capital contribution made by the sponsors,
coupled with the disproportionately large share of the profits accruing to
them as holders of the common stock, the company was often caused to
engage in highly speculative policies. 78 Resort was also had to these poli77
cies in an effort to meet the high fixed charges of the senior securities.
Besides all this, the highly complex capital structure put the general investor at a further disadvantage since
it became increasingly difficult to
78
analyze and evaluate the securities.
The senior securities giving rise to the leverage 79 which proved so
profitable for the insiders were usually themselves inadequately protected.
The preferred shareholders suffered from a "thin" capital cushion8 0 and
from a lack of voting rights."' Actually their "preferences" were often
illusory, vanishing at the very moment when they were needed. Thus various maneuvers were gone through depriving the preferred of their priority
rights on liquidation or dissolution. 2 And because the vote of the corn74. See VI, Shifts in Control, infra p. 607.
75. See the statistics given for ten investment companies, REPORT, Part 3, c. V, pp.
14-I15.
76. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. Ig.
77. See the testimony of Mr. Jonathan Lovelace, one of the sponsors of the Invest-

ment Company of America, REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 117; testimony of Mr. Edwin Rankin of the United Founders Corporation group, id. at 118.
78. This was especiallly true of Eastern Utilities Investing Corporation which had
outstanding "one series of debentures, three series of preferred stock, one series of
participating preferred stock and two series of common stock . . . and each type of
security had different rights, privileges, qualifications and limitations". REPORT, Part 3,
c. V, p. i29. The financial structure of the Central States Electric Corporation and its
affiliated companies, under the domination of Mr. Harrison Williams, was even more
complex. See the testimony of Mr. Williams, id. at i55, and of Mr. Clifford Stone,
president of Shenandoah Corporation and Blue Ridge Corporation, id. at 157.
79. "Leverage" is a term applied to investment companies having "outstanding
senior securities with fixed or relatively fixed maximum participations in the corporate
assets and earnings. . . . As a consequence, any given change in the total assets will
give rise to a more than proportionate change in the equity of the common stock." REPORT, Part i, p. 33.
8o. See note 75 supra.
81. In almost all investment companies the voting power resided in the common
stock which was controlled by the sponsor or other inside group. In some cases, however, the default in the payment of preferred dividends for a stipulated period created
a voting right in the preferred. Even this contingent right was circumvented in the
case of the American Capital Corporation which had an affiliated company, Pacific
Southern Investors, Inc., controlled by the same sponsors, buy up enough of the defaulted preferred to keep the existing management in power. REPORT, Part 3, c. V,
p. 267.

82. See the testimony of Mr. Carroll E. Gray, Jr., in connection with the history
of Burco, Inc., the control of which was sold to a new management group. The new
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mon stock was necessary to liquidate the investment company, this possibility was frequently ignored where it would have been the most prudent
step in order to protect the preferred. 83 Moreover, common dividends
were in some instances paid out of capital or capital gains.8 4 The power
in the directors to allocate contributions received for securities facilitated
this practice.8 5 The common stock-control was also exercised to coerce
the preferred shareholders into yielding their rights to accumulated unpaid
dividends.86 The senior position of the preferred was at times similarly
impaired by the creation of additional bank indebtedness8 7 or of another
class of preferred with additional rights.8 The repurchasing of securities also adversely affected the preferred.8 9
Even where funded debt-bonds and debentures-formed part of the
capital set-up, the holders of these securities were in fact in a precarious
position. Thus:
"The debenture holders were the recipients of practically none of
the safeguards or protections which frequently accompany bonds or debentures. The debentures were not supplied with a cushion of assets;
they had no 'touch-off' clause; no sinking fund requirements; no
reserve for interest; no provisions precluding the payment of dividends on common stock before interest on the debentures was fully
paid or when the debentures were not fully covered by assets; no
prohibition against the issuance of additional debentures having a
priority over or a parity with existing debentures except in certain
instances; no provision automatically accelerating the maturity of the
debentures in the event of default in the payment of interest; and
group used the company's own assets to purchase control, and, as a result of subsequent
operations, half of the assets of Burco, Inc., were dissipated to the detriment of the preferred shareholders, who were unable to compel a dissolution of the company and a distribution of its assets to themselves. REPoRT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 487 et seq.
83. "As early as April 9, I93O, the lack of success of Ungerleider Financial Corporation led to requests by stockholders of the company that it be dissolved. Samuel
Ungerleider & Company, however, refused to assent to a dissolution of the company,
first, because it would have reflected upon the prestige and reputation of the firm, and,
second, because it was felt that the downward trend in the market for securities might
cease in the near future." REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 251. See also the history of Atlantic Securities Corporation where "the alternative of dissolution of their corporation was
not offered to the preferred shareholders". Id. at 278.
84. See the discussion of the practices of United States & International Securities
Corporation, American Capital Corporation, and Jackson & Curtis Securities Corporation. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 172 et seq. Similarly, the United Founders group of investment companies "failed to segregate profits from the sale of investments from the
other earnings" although Dr. L. R. Robinson, who was active in the) management of
those companies, had urged the adoption of such practice in his book on investment
companies. Id. at 182; ROBINSON, op. cit. supranote 2, at 36-368.
85. Those states in which the majority of investment companies have been incorporated permit the allocation of contributed capital to paid-in surplus and the payment
of dividends therefrom. DEL-. REv. CODE (1935) c. 65, §§ i4,34; I MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 23, §39; 2 MAss. Gm. LAWS (932) c. i56, §§ I5,35; N. Y. SToCK
CoRP. LAW §§ 32, 13, 58.
86. DEWING, CoPuoRATIoN FINANCE (rev. ed. 193) 22; (939) 88 U. oF PA. L.
Rar. 114; cf. Havender v. Federal United Corporation, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan.
i8,1940, p. I, col. I (Del. Sup. Ct. i94o).
87. Thus The Equity Corporation "hypothecated its entire portfolio, including the
stock to be purchased with the proceeds of the loans, to secure loans from a bank in
order to acquire Reliance International Corporation, another investment company".
REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 421. Mr. David Milton, president of The Equity Corporation,
testified concerning this transaction with the bank: "We told them that we would give
them anything that they would like to have." Id. at 243.
88. See the discussion of Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corporation. REPORT, Part
3, C. V, p. 251 et seq.

89. See IV, The Repurchase of Securities, infra p.

602.
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no provisions specifying events of default or remedies upon defaults." 90
The existence of a "touch-off" clause 91 providing a minimum percentage of coverage for the funded debt is generally considered "a vital
safeguard",9 2 but even where it was provided its effectiveness depended on
the kind of provisions "made in the indenture for the immediate and
accurate detection of the relationship of net assets to the amount of bonded
indebtedness, the nature of the rights which the bondholders acquire if
the 'touch-off' point is reached, and the provisions for the expeditious
enforcement of these rights". 93 The indenture provisions were not infrequently rendered ineffective in this respect by their vagueness."' Furthermore, the "touch-off" clause was not an unmitigated blessing since, to
avert its enforcement, the management was sometimes moved to liquidate
the portfolio. 95 The mere presence of a "touch-off" clause often aroused
a conflict of interest between the funded debt holders who wished its protection and the shareholders who wished to avoid its enforcement.
Beyond these problems peculiar to themselves, funded debt holders,
like preferred shareholders, suffered from the payment of dividends out
of capital, repurchasing activities, the creation of additional securities or
bank indebtedness, the lack of voting rights and generally reckless management policies. 6
All the evidence points to a legislative requirement that investment
97
companies issue only one uniform class of securities,
a common stock
98
having a par value and general, equal voting rights.
Of importance is the fact that the creation of senior securities is, in
reality, "a gamble on net capital gains" 9 since it has been shown that
the rate of net current earnings of investment companies over a period
of years has been less than the rate of the fixed charges on the senior
securities. In other words, the cost of issuing funded debt has averaged
over 5 per cent. and the cost of issuing preferred stock has averaged over
6 per cent., while the average net earnings on total assets has been about
9o. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 28o, discussing the debentures of Shawmut Bank Investment Trust.
91. A touch-off clause is a "covenant that the company wilL at all times maintain
a certain minimum asset coverage for the bonds or a margin of assets over total liabilities". REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 9. If the assets fall below the prescribed percentage that
is a default with the possibility of foreclosure and receivership.
92. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 295. See also GRAHAm AND DODD, SECUITY AlALY1SS (1934) 211-212.

93. REPORT,
92, at 201-203.

Part 3, c. V, p. 295. See also GRAHAmx

AND

DODD, op. cit.
supra note

94. "It may be said generally that the majority of investment companies which did
include a 'touch-off' provision in the indenture rendered. the 'touch-off' clause ineffectual
by failing to introduce sufficiently definite criteria with respect to the elements of the
covenant and by failing to impose upon the trustee any responsibility in connection with
the ascertainment of compliance or any standard of accountability to bondholders for
abstaining from enforcing a default." REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 295.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1149 (939), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77aaa
(Supp. 1939), is an attempt to remedy many of these problems.
95. The Reliance Management Corporation within less than two weeks liquidated
securities which had cost $3,450,0oo, realizing thereon only $1,075,000. REPORT, Part 3,
c. V, p. 318. Mr. Morton H. Fry, president of the corporation, testified that this liquidation had been forced on the company "against our better judgment!' by the existence
of the "touch-off" clause. Ibid.
96. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, P. 324 et seq.
97. Cf. I CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 53.
98. See BERLE AND MmAws, op. cit. supra note 5o, at 249 et seq.; Douglas, note 49
.upra, at 1330.
99. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 23.
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per cent. 00 A superior management performance has not materialized to make up for this lack of margin between net current yield and net
cost of senior securities. 1 1 And the possibility of capital gains is itself
such a fluctuating and uncertain one that the issuance of senior securities
would appear economically unjustifiable.""
To this must be added the host of abuses described above, made possible by the presence of a multiple-security structure. As stated by the
SEC:
"The senior security holders are interested in only such a margin
of operating profit as will suffice to pay them the limited fixed annual
return; the equity security holders are interested in a broad margin
of profit, as all of the earnings except the fixed charges will inure
to them. The senior security holders have been sold their securities
on the theory of the safety of their principal, while the equity security
holders have been sold their securities upon the theory of 'leverage',
greater play for their money, or speculative advantages. Yet the control of the fund, and consequently the safety of the senior security
holders' investment, is almost invariably completely in the hands of
the equity stockholders, to whom the fulfillment of the pledge of
safety is wholly entrusted.
"In the very fact that senior and equity securities have different
rights, privileges and protections, lies the seed of conflict of inter3Y2

est." 108

This conflict of interest is, of course, antipathetic to the essential purpose
of investment companies as a mutuality of undertaking. Moreover, the
complex capital structure prevents the senior and equity security holders
from ratably sharing in both the diversification of risk and the success
of the company. The senior security holders cannot share equally in the
profits of the company since their participation is limited; the junior
security holders cannot share equally in the diversification of risk since
their contribution is subject to the first hazards of the company.
The inescapable conclusion thus seems to be that the most wholesome
capital structure for an investment company calls for only one uniform
class of security. A common stock having a par value and general, equal
voting rights would narrow the gap between "control" and "ownership",' 0 '
would assure all the shareholders an equal participation in the company
in accordance with its true economic functions, would abolish largely the
conflicts of interest inherent in the multiple-security structure, and would
prevent many of the abuses which the security holders have previously
experienced.
As a further protection, the rule adopted by the SEC as to public
utility holding companies and their subsidiaries should be extended to
investment companies, namely, that except upon application to, and approval by order of the SEC, no such company shall declare or pay any
dividend out of capital or unearned surplus. 0 5 In general, the payment
of dividends should be permitted only out of that income received by the
investment company as dividends or interest on the portfolio securities.10 6
xoo. Id. at 21-22.
ioi. See note 24 supra.
102. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 23.
1o3. Id. at 30.
lO4. See, however, BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. mspra note 5o, Book IV.
IO5. Rule U-2c-2, C. C. H. Secur. Act. Serv. 184ooA (1937). See Note (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 492.
io6. See Shaviro, note 2 mspra; Note (194o) 49 YALE L. 3. 492.

NOTES

Closely related to the capital structure of the investment company is
the problem of control. By use of the multiple-security structure, as
already pointed out, the sponsors and other insiders were able to obtain
and perpetuate their control. This was also accomplished by means of
the form of business association adopted. Thus the trustees of the "Massachusetts Trust" type of investment company 107 and the managers of the
joint stock company type of investment company10 were comparatively
free from all control by investors. The SEC has stated that "the organic
form of some investment companies was in no small measure dictated
by a desire to control large pools of funds without the necessity for any
substantial investment by the managers." 109
The advocated common stock type of security with full voting rights,
when coupled with the regulation of the proxy machinery 110 and control
of the issuance of option warrants,' would obviate many of the difficulties arising from this situation. Thereby, a closer connection between
"control" and "ownership" should result, entailing a greater voice in the
management of the enterprise for the public investor. The suggested
provisions requiring capital contributions by sponsors and directors would
also work toward this end. In addition, however, a time limitation should
be set on the running of voting trust agreements 112 and management contracts.1 8 And, in accordance with provisions established by many states
io7. At the end of 1936, 2o management investment companies proper were of the
"Massachusetts Trust" type of organization. REPORT, Part 2, vol. I, c. 2, Appendix
Table 16.
io8. The Adams Express Company is the only investment company which is a
joint stock association. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 383.
1o9. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 378.
iio. For a newspaper discussion of the reaction to the proposed new proxy rules
of the SEC, see N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1939, § 3, P. I, col. I. See also Dean, NonCompliance With Proxy Regulations (1939) 24 CoRN. L. Q. 483; Note, Regulation of
Proxy Solicitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv.
914.
III. Specific information concerning the issuance of option warrants must be given
in the schedule filed under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 88 (I933), 15 U. S. C.
A. § 77aa (Supp. 1939).
112. Apparently because of the lack of sales appeal of a company utilizing the voting trust, the device was infrequently adopted, only 9 out of 15o companies examined
by the SEC having such an agreement. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 4o7, n. 2o8.

In those states having statutes legalizing the voting trust, a io years limitation is
usually placed upon it. Because of the "autocratic" powers vested in the trustees under
these agreements, it may seriously be doubted whether their use should be permitted at
all in investment companies. New York prohibits the voting trust in banking corporations. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 50.
I13. ".

.

.

the period of duration and right of renewal of such contracts are not

at present regulated by statute." REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 416. As of Dec. 31, 1935,
68 investment companies had management contracts. Id. at 419. Thus although those
sponsoring and directing investment companies sold their securities on the basis of representations as to their management abilities, they in effect delegated their powers in
this respect to others. See as to this Sherman & Ellis v. Indiana Mutual Casualty Co.,
41 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o)A where the court held unenforceable as against
public policy a 2o-year management contract granted by the directors to a management
company.
The existence of a management contract subjects the company to the possibility of
the same abuses of powers as in the case of the voting trust agreement, REPORT, Part 3,
c. V, p. 414, et seq., and a strong argument can be made for the total prohibition of
such contracts in investment companies.
This entire subject of management contracts, investment counsel and the like is

worthy of an extended discussion which space will not allow to be made here. See,
however, the supplemental report made by the SEC in connection with its over-all
study of investment trusts and investment companies, REPORT ON INVESTMENT COuNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY
SERWICES.
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for banks and insurance companies, the legislation on investment companies should stipulate that only the corporate form of organization be
utilized. 1 4
III. THE SALE OF SECURITIES
Many abuses arose in connection with the sale of securities by investment companies. 115 Again there was the conflict of interest in sponsors
and directors as a result of their activities in professional financing
groups.""6 This led to the dictation of underwriting agreements without
benefit of competitive bidding." 7 Another result was the failure of underwriters, in the great majority of cases, to make firm commitments. Instead
they promised merely to use their "best efforts"." 8 Even where firm com114. 13 STAT. 100 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. § 21 (1936) ; DEL. REV. CODE (1935)

c.

66, § I; I MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. II, §20; art. 48A, § 13; 2 MAss. GEN.
LAws (1932) c. 168, § 7; c. 171, § 2; N. Y. BANKING LAW § io0; N. Y. INS. LAW § 70.
It has also been suggested that all investment companies be made open-end companies thereby enabling the shareholder to compel the company to purchase or redeem
his shares at their net asset value less a small redemption fee. This would afford a
steady market for the shareholder and would serve to keep the market price of the
security at approximately the asset value.
Since 1929 the great majority of investment companies have been of the open-end
type, apparently because of the greater sales appeal.
Compare also on the general requirement of incorporation of investment companies
I, The Definition of "Investment Company", supra p. 586, and the discussion of the
power of Congress to regulate corporations, supra p. 59o.
15. "It is . . . estimated that the grand total of sales of securities by investment companies of all types from their inception in this country up to the end of 1937
was approximately $7,2oo,ooo,ooo." REPORT, Part 2, vol. 2, c. 3, P. 5. Of this amount
$6,500,ooo,ooo worth of securities were sold during the period 1927-,936. Ibid.
An additional development within the investment company industry has been the installment investment plan by which "substantially, a certificate or security was sold to
the public on the installment plan which represented an interest in some underlying security-a security of a fixed trust or of a management investment company (either closedend or open-end) or a diversified group of portfolio securities". It was claimed that
these various plans Were developed to fill an economic need-an outlet whereby persons
in the lower income brackets could invest in common stocks. There seems, however, to
have been little actual evidence of such an "economic need", and basically the installment investment plan appears merely to have been another device for selling securities
-more high-pressured, frequently more deceptive and more costly.
The device, moreover, was permeated with all sorts of abusive practices. There
were an incredible number of secret and excessive fees charged to the investor with
resultant profit to the sponsors, who were frequently inexperienced. The sponsors
notably failed in their fiduciary duties and the so-called "trustees" also failed to live up
to their position. Although called "trustees" and widely advertised as such, they were
little more than custodians of the underlying securities. The sales material was highpressured and deceptive, and various "sweetening" measures, especially insurance and
loan provisions, were adopted to aid in the sale. Within a period of seven years, the
certificate holders of 33 plans, representing almost this entire phase of the industry,
had lost approximately 33% of their investment. See generally the SEC's supple-

mentary

REPORT ON COMPANIES SPONSORING INSTALLMENT INVESTMENT PLANS; IIIstallnent Investment Plans-HowNot to Save $zo a Month (194o) I YouR INVEST-

38.
The installment investment plan has been shot through with so many abuses and
has proved itself of such doubtful worth that it might be argued that the device should
be entirely abolished. If not, however, the provisions suggested in this note would
bring about much-needed reforms. Above all, a regulation of the fees distributing them
uniformly over the entire life of the plan, the prohibition of deceptive literature and
high-pressured selling schemes, the imposition of active fiduciary duties on sponsors
and custodians and full disclosure to investors would be necessary.
II6. REPORT, Part 3, c. III, pp. 93, 156.
MENTS

117. Id. at 93.

18. Id. at 98. "One consequence of the widespread use of the so-called 'bestefforts' underwriting contracts was that the closed-end investment companies and their
prospective shareholders had no assurance that the amount of capital which the prospectuses anticipated would ever be raised." Ibid.

NOTES

mitments were actually made, underwriters, who were also the sponsors,
were sometimes released from their obligations when the market fell." 9

"Sponsors-underwriters" also in other ways liquidated their original investment in the company, usually without any disclosure2 0 to the other
security holders. Despite this they often retained control.
Even without their assumption of responsibility, underwriters often
received varied and excessive compensation from the company, not all of
which was disclosed to the security holders.12 1 Underwriters sometimes

exacted excessive and secret fees from investors so that the company

actually received a lesser portion of the capital contributed by the security
holders than was represented. 22 The SEC reports that all sorts of high-

pressure and manipulative selling practices were resorted to in the actual
sale of investment company securities to the public. 2 8

These naturally

caused an artificial market evaluation of the securities, which only served
to place the company in a false position and delude investors. Sometimes
as soon as the investment 2company
was established, extensive switching
4
operations were attempted.

Of course, since the passage of the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, many of these
conditions have been remedied. The underwriting contract is now attached

as an exhibit to the registration statement filed with the SEC. The
contract must also be summarized in the statement and in the prospectus.
Thus disclosure is made of all commissions or discounts received by the

underwriters, directly or indirectly, of all options received by them and
of all preferential rights granted them as to future issues of the registrant.

Furthermore, Sections ii and 12 of the Securities Act, imposing civil lia-

bility for any untrue statement of a material fact, or failure to state a
material fact in the registration statement or prospectus, cover underwriters.
But although these matters are thereby disclosed, no definite prescribed form or content for the underwriting agreement has been laid

down. What has been said in another connection seems aptly to point the
iig. Examples are found in Ungerleider Financial Corporation, id. at 168, and Federated Capital Corporation, id. at 171.
i2o. Examples are found in United States & Foreign Securities Corporation, id. at
174, American, British & Continental Corporation, id. at 178; and General American
Investors, Inc., id. at 183.
121. 184 management investment companies reported to the SEC that they had paid
$I16,5i9,ooo to market $2,iog,ooo,ooo worth of securities. Thus the compensation to the
underwriters averaged about 5.5% of the selling price and 5.8% of the net proceeds to
the company. Id. at I56. This merely represents the cash compensation. Remuneration also took the form of option warrants, free stock and the indirect benefits resulting
from the control and management of large pools of funds.
i22. See the discussion of the practices of T. I. S. Management Corporation, sponsor and depositor of Trusteed Industry Shares, id. at 6o et seq. The investment trust
received only 889o of the funds contributed although the prospectus stated that the trust
would receive approximately

9I%%.

Id. at 69.

Connections with important individuals and corporations were sought and then
widely exploited; security issues were "sweetened" by means of conversion privileges,
free stock and option warrants; unit offerings and part-paid security issues were also
used; and various market operations were carried out. Id. at 113 et seq.
124. "The nature of open-end companies and fixed trusts, particularly their obligation to redeem their shares or certificates at asset value, has made their securities vulnerable to 'switching' operations, i. e., attempts by dealers to persuade customers to sell
the shares of one investment company and to use the proceeds to buy those of another.
Distributors, dealers and salesmen profited from each sale of an investment company
issue, whether the sale involved the investment of additional funds by a customer or
merely his liquidation of one issue to buy another. Such operations may, however, be
costly to investors since they may involve the payment of a new load on each shift."
123.

REPORT, Part 2, vol. 2, c. 3, PP. 40-41.
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way to proper handling of this phase of the subject under the prospective
investment company act:
"Specific statement in a statute, within minimal and practicable limits,
has several advantages. It makes more definite and certain the business and legal rules involved. Furthermore, the isolation and specific
treatment of the various malpractices and abuses which have arisen
will make for more effective administration and control." 125
Despite the opposition which will undoubtedly be strongly voiced,
the statutory requirements of competitive bidding and firm commitments
by underwriters for investment company securities should be productive
of the best results for the industry.1 26 In addition, it would be advisable
that a prescribed schedule of fees and a standardized method of calculating
the basis selling price of the security be authorized to be set out by the
SEC. The information called for under the Securities Act127 in connection with the registration statement merely includes data as to the
method by which such selling price is computed; the investment company
act should go further and, for purposes of uniformity and certainty, enable
the SEC to standardize this method.
Existing legislation has already made unlawful the puffing or depressing of security prices through the use of manipulative devices in sales and
trading.1 28 The Securities Exchange Act,12 9 so effectively administered
by the SEC, will continue to prove a salutary check on such activities,
as far as listed investment company securities are concerned. However,
the check on the use of manipulative devices on sales and trading of overthe-counter investment company securities will, in large measure, depend
on the effectiveness of the self-regulating associations under the Maloney
Act. 30 Legislative consideration need, therefore, be given merely to
such additional powers necessary to be conferred on the SEC so that
unlawful over-the-counter market operations in investment company securities may be systematically and efficiently prevented.

IV. THE REPURCHASE OF SECURITIES
Coincident with the investment companies efforts to sell its securities
were its frequently extensive market operations in repurchasing its own
securities.' 2 ' Thus the sponsors sometimes forced the company to "maintain" the market during distribution despite the fact that the underwriting
commissions being paid were adequate to cover such operations by the
underwriter.3 2 These repurchases also aided the sponsors in their secondary market operations after the completion of the original distribu125. Douglas, note 49 supra, at 1322.

126. The requirement of competitive bidding has been bitterly opposed in the hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1940, p. 31, col. 8; Jan. 11, 1940, p. 31, col. I. See also Lockwood and Anderson, Under-

writing Contracts, Within Purview of Securities Act of Y933; With Certain Suggested
Provisions (1939) 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 33.
127. 48 STAT.88 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §77aa (Supp. 1939).
128. 48 STAT.889 (I934), 15 U. S. C. A. §78i (Supp. 1939).
129. 48 STAT.881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78a (Supp. 1939).
130. 52 STAT. I070 (1938), I5 U. S. C. A. §78o-3 (Supp. 1939).
131. "During the years 1927 to 1936, investment trusts and investment companies

repurchased or redeemed approximately $1,200,oooooo of their own securities, valued on
the basis of the cost to the trusts and companies." REPORT, Part 2,vol. 2, c. 3,P. 9.
Cf. note 115 supra.
132. REPORT, Part 3, c. III, pp. 191-192, discussing the market operations of Ungerleider Financial Corporation, Iroquois Share Corporation and Italian Superpower Corporation.
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tion.' 3 3 The usual reason given for these subsequent repurchases was
that they were "to police" the market or were "to bring the price in line
with other issues." 134 Naturally these operations were caried on secretly,
and whether they were for the stated purpose or really to prepare the
market for additional financing or to facilitate exchange offers, the result
was that the security holders could not accurately appraise the securities,
and thereby the market ceased to fulfill its function., 5
After 1929 repurchases increased considerably. 18 6 In the beginning
they were generally made to support or stabilize the precipitately declining
market.1 37 But at least part of these operations were induced by the sponsors' desires to protect their own prestige. 138 At the same time, however,
these operations incidentally enabled the sponsors to use company funds to
enhance the value of their own holdings and provided them with brokerage
commissions.8 9
Following the collapse in the market, the market value of investment
company securities in practically all cases fell below their actual asset
values. 140 It followed, therefore, that if the company repurchased its own
shares it would profit by the difference between the two values, and this
was the chief reason advanced for the large scale repurchases that were
effected.' 4 - While it is true that the company and the remaining security
holders profited thereby, it is nevertheless true that those who disposed
of their securities suffered to the same extent. 142 The treatment of the
latter became increasingly inequitable because they had no knowledge of
the extent of the discount at which they were selling their shares nor any
information that the investment company, rather than the general public,
was buying their shares. 43 Furthermore, these extensive repurchasing
operations, together with the secrecy usually surrounding them, had the
effect of bolstering the prestige of the management and increasing unreasonably the security holders' confidence. Although generally repurchases
were justified as being the "best buys" at the time, there was no such
disclosure to the selling security holders. This, the SEC indicates, perhaps violated the existing fiduciary relationship. 144 In any event, the repurchase of securities reduced to that extent the working capital of the
company and enabled the1 45management to shift at will the asset value
underlying the securities.
133. Ibid.

134. REPORT, Part 2, vol. 2, c. 3, P. 57. It should be noted, however, that the prices
of these other issues may also have reflected "stabilizing" or market operations. Ibid.
135. BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 5o, at 174-176; Berle, Liability for
Stock Market Manipulation (193I) 31 Cot. L. REV. 264. From January 3o till September 1931 Tri-Continental Corporation engaged in extensive repurchasing operations,
representing approximately 859 of all reported transactions in that security on the New
York exchanges. REPORT Part 3, c. III, p. 2o5. The price of the stock was kept above
go although comparable securities were rapidly declining. Id. at 207, Chart i. The
market price broke to 587A when the company decreased its repurchases. Id. at 208.
136. Thus "approximately one-third of total repurchases [of closed-end companies]
were effected in the year 1930, alone". Id. at 189. See also REPoRT, Part 2, vol. 2, c. 3,
Table ig.
137. Berle, note 135 supra, at 278, n. 25.
138. REoRT, Part 3, c. III, p. 170.
139. Id. at 193.
14o. The average discount was approximately 35%. See the testimony of Mr.
Floyd Odum, REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. I, n. i; for the SEC's statistics see REPoRT,
Part 2, vol. 2, c. 4.
141. Id. at pp. 58-61.
142. REPORT, Part 3, C. III, p. 204.
143. Ibid.
I44. Id. at 205.
145. Although there is a fairly general statutory provision that repurchases be made
only out of "surplus", the adaptable definitions of "capital" and "surplus" may nullify

604

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Where the repurchases were of common stock while preferred stock
was outstanding, the effect was to reduce the capital cushion available
to the preferred. Where the repurchases were of funded debt securities
or preferred stock, the effect was to create a profit on behalf of the common
-which was usually held by the sponsors. But a still more dangerous
purpose of the repurchase of bonds was to prevent the operation of "touchoff" clauses. By repurchasing bonds and debentures below their principal
amounts, the company's debt was reduced proportionately more than its
assets, thereby increasing the percentage of asset coverage of the remain46
ing outstanding bonds above the level provided in the "touch-off" clause.
was
itself
many
cases
which
in
By such action, however, the management,
largely responsible for the financial plight of the company, was enabled
to continue in office at a time when it might have been more advantageous
to the security holders to liquidate the enterprise.
Repurchases were at times made from insiders who were thus enabled
to sell their securities at a higher price than they could command in the
market because of the size of their holdings. 47 The insiders thereby
profited without any disclosure being made to the other security holders.
Where these repurchases were at premiums over the asset value dilution
48
Reof the assets of the remaining security holders naturally resulted
purchases were also made to eliminate opposition elements to the management 14' and as a device to facilitate mergers. 5 0 In neither case was there
disclosure to the security holders.
These operations in general became so widespread that on May 26,
193o the Listing Committee of the New York Stock Exchange passed a
rule forbidding investment companies from purchasing their own shares
of stock save in exceptional circumstances. "The theory apparently was
that to put the trading corporation in the market adversely to its own
shareholders was too unsound a situation to be encouraged." ''
The repurchase of securities by holding companies or their subsidiaries has since been closely regulated by the Public Utility Holding Company Act. 52 It is suggested that similar regulations be applied to investment companies. Application for the approval of the acquisition of securities should be made to the SEC setting forth, inter alia, a balance sheet
of the company, a description of the proposed transaction and its effect on
the operations and financial condition of the company, its effect on the
security holders, the identity of the sellers of the securities to be acquired
this restriction. For the general thesis that repurchasing operations accomplish a recapitalization of the corporation without conforming to statutory provisions, see Levy,
Purchase by a Corporationof its Ozun Stock (293o) 15 MiNN. L. Rxv. i.
146. REPoRT, Part 3, c. III, p. 248. At least 2o different offers of exchange were
sent to the debenture holders of Eastern Utilities Investing Corporation from 1931 to
,935. Whe the trustee notified the company of a default, efforts were made to secure
enough debentures to amend the indenture by abrogating the "touch-off" clause, which
was subsequently accomplished. Id. at 250.
147. Id. at 218 et seq. and the cases there discussed of Allied General Corporation,
Sisto Financial Corporation, General Investment Corporation and Interstate Equities
Corporation.
148. Liberty Share Corporation paid on an average of double the asset value in repurchasing its own shares. Id. at 237.
149. See the discussion of Oils & Industries, Inc., id. at 242; National Investors
Corporation group, id. at 243.
i5o. Perhaps the best known example is the market operations of The Goldman
Sachs Trading Corporation which was combined with Financial and Industrial Securities Corporation. Within four days the stock of the Trading Corporation rose from
$136.50 per share to $222.50 per share, twice its asset value. Id. at 257.
15i. Berle, note 135 supra, at 277, n. 24.
152. Rule U-2c-1, C. C. H. Secur. Act Serv. 1184oo (1937).
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and their relationship to the company, with information as to what safeguards are being adopted to assure fairness. The fees or commissions to
be paid should be disclosed and a statement made of the requisite action
taken to conform to provisions in the certificate of incorporation, state
laws or federal regulations. The amount of such repurchases permitted
in any calendar year should be limited to a percentage of the total assets
of the investment company.
The malpractices attendant upon the repurchase of securities were
greatly exaggerated by the existence of a multiple-security structure since
the management was then enabled to shift asset values and to favor its
own holdings. The suggested simple capital structure would, however,
eliminate the possibility of such abuse.
The SEC should have the power to disclose any information necessary to protect the security holders. Nevertheless, confidential essential
business secrets should be protected since there are instances in which
market operations by the company are in fact defensive or protective measures.""8 But as Professor Berle has written:
"The answer to this question lies precisely in the matter of disclosure. If the investor is aware that the market price represents operations of the corporation itself, he at least has in his possession information permitting him to evaluate the apparent appraisal of the
market price. He may then act, at his peril, to be sure, but at least with
knowledge of what the apparent market quotation really means. The
vice of the present situation is that he is permitted and induced to act
54
on the strength of a supposed situation which in fact does not exist." 1
V.

THE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF THE COMPANY

The SEC's Report discloses case after case in which those in control
of the company failed to conduct its business primarily for the benefit of
the security holders. As has been constantly reiterated, the conflicts of
interest were such that self-dealing became rife. In fact, the investment
company was often merely used to further the purposes of the sponsors.
Thus the company became a device to extend control, to sponsor other
companies, to support other financial ventures, to buy the securities of
affiliated or "system" companies and to make loans to insiders. All of these
functions are, of course, quite apart from the purchase for investment of
a diversified portfolio of securities, a function which the general investor
took to be the purpose of an investment company. In this way the discretionary power of the management over the portfolio was abused, and, as
pointed out above, these changes in investment policy and corporate purpose were in many cases made before notifying or securing the consent of
the security holders.
Another not unusual practice was for the sponsors to pyramid investment companies and systems of companies to get the advantage of the consequent leverage and, incidentally, of the underwriting business. Sometimes the management attempted to impart an air of propriety to these
varied activities by including in the certificate of incorporation a contractual
waiver of the general prohibition against self-dealing or by securing a
subsequent blanket ratification of all acts of the management. Reports
to the security holders were both infrequent and inadequate, and the
accounting practices adopted helped give an inaccurate picture of the
condition of the company. The various fees and other forms of compen153. Berle, note 135 supra, at 278, n. 25. See generally BEE AND MEANS, op. Cit.
supra note 50, at 174-176.
154. Berle, note 135 supra at 278.
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sation received by the management were sometimes excessive, and the
sponsors further profited by the sale to the investment company of securities in which they were interested. Moreover, the very liquid character
of the assets of an investment company made it easy for an unscrupulous
or dishonest person to divert them to his own use.
The general investigation of the character, ability and responsibility
of those sponsoring and managing investment companies; the imposition
of affirmative fiduciary duties; the bonding of those handling funds or
negotiable securities; the prohibition against dealings between the company
and its officials in their individual capacities; the prohibition against contractual waivers and "over-all" sanctioning clauses; the segregation of
conflicts of interests; the provision enabling the corporation to recover
from the directors any profits made by the use of inside information; the
standardizing of accounting practices; I' the regulation of the solicitation
of proxies; the requirement of a physical check on the assets by an independent accountant; the simple capital structure; the requirement of more
frequent and fuller reports to shareholders; the limitation on charter amendments affecting the corporate purpose; and the constant requirement of
disclosure to the SEC-all will tend to check and prevent these management abuses.
Where management contracts are entered into, a time limitation should
be placed upon them. The compensation paid under such contracts should
be a flat fixed amount, rather than a fee contingent upon profits or securities bought and sold or assets controlled, since the latter form of compensation enables the managers to be paid irrespective of the operative
experience of the company. 15 6
Of considerable moment is the desirability of the imposition of some
limitation upon the scope of the management's discretion over investment
policy. To be taken possibly as a working basis for such limitation, in
accordance with the suggestions made in relation to the corporate purposes,
are the covenants actually adopted by some "companies providing:
"that the corporation make no investment: (a) in real estate; (b)
which involved promotion or management on the part of the corporation of other enterprises; (c) in any corporate stock or other
security which represented participation in the business risk of any
new and unproved enterprise; (d) in any security about which reliable
information was not available with respect to history, management,
earnings and income, of the governmental authority, corporation or
organization issuing the same." :"'
To realize true diversification, there was also "a categorical prohibition
against the investment of more than 5 per cent. of the assets of the company in the securities of any one corporation or other organization." 158
A clear definition of "assets" and of the accounting practices by which they
are to be determined would, however, be necessary to effectuate fully the
covenant. 55 The covenant should, furthermore, be strictly construed.
155. Under § i of the Holding Company Act, the SEC is given power to provide
for uniform accounting methods. 49 STAT. 828 (i935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 (o)(i)
(Supp. 1939). For a discussion of the accounting practices of investment companies
see GRAHrAM AND DODD, op. cit. supra note 92, at 357-36o.
156. See note 113 supra. Cf. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 401.
157. This provision was in the indenture of Pacific Southern Investors, Inc. REPORT, Part 3, c. V, p. 350.
I58. Ibid.
359. Id. at 351-355. For typical investment restrictions see ROBINSON, op. cit. supra
note 2, Appendix D.

NOTES
VI.

SHIFTS IN CONTROL

Another aspect of the operation of investment companies, but one to
be treated separately, concerns those problems and abuses arising out of
the shifts in control of such companies with subsequent merger or consolidation or dissolution. Because the market values of investment company
securities were on an average 35 per cent. below the asset values, following
the crash of 1929, a profit equal to the difference between the two values
could be made by acquiring the securities of a company at the market
price. 1 0 Companies were formed for the very purpose of taking advantage
of this situation '8 ' and an active market developed in the barter and sale
of investment companies.6 2 The acquiring corporation did not have to
pay cash but could issue its own securities as consideration and could then
subsequently realize the true asset value of the acquired securities through
dissolution, merger or consolidation. The high degree of liquidity of the
assets of investment companies and the virtual absence of any regulation
of their activities also offered an opportunity for those acquiring the companies to divert the assets to their own use.183 Moreover, profit could
easily be realized by acquiring several such companies and selling one to
another.164
Although those in control owed a fiduciary duty '65 to the security
holders who had, in most instances, already suffered large losses under
the existing management, little or no attempt was made to protect the
i6o. See note 140 supra.
16I. Examples are The Equity Corporation and Yosemite Holding Corporation,

REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 4, n. 6.

162. Apparently in some instances shifts in control were made to cut operating and
management costs. See testimony of Mr. Earle Bailie in connection with Tri-Continental Corporation. Id. at 6, n. 8.
But the bartering became so active "that certain individuals were regularly engaged
in the business of acting as brokers in the sale of control of investment companies". Id.
at 77. Atlas Corporation, for instance, paid out approximately $1,407,9o in "finder's
fees". Ibid. The SEC states:
"Ultimately, these 'finder's fees' paid by acquiring corporations or individuals were
recouped out of profits derived in the acquisition by purchase or exchange offers of the
securities of acquired companies for a consideration less than the actual asset value of
such securities as was the case in Atlas Corporation and The Equity Corporation, or
from profits derived by self-dealing with the assets of acquired companies, as in the
case of the group of investment companies acquired by the Fiscal Management Group.
In other words, the 'finder's fees' and other costs of acquisition were ultimately in effect
paid by stockholders of acquired companies." Id. at 79.
163. Thus certain individuals, referred to by the SEC as the Fiscal Management
Group, acquired control of four investment companies "without the expenditure of any
of their own funds. In essence, their scheme was to contract to buy a controlling block
of stock of an investment company; to pay for this block of stock with funds borrowed
on the portfolio securities of the very investment company to be acquired; to take
control of the investment company and immediately liquidate the portfolio securities in
order to raise the cash needed to pay off the loan; to transfer the controlling block of
stock to the Fiscal Management Company, Ltd., their personal holding company; to
reimburse the investment company for its portfolio securities sold by transferring to the
investment companies preferred stock of the Fiscal Management Company, Ltd., and
other securities of doubtful value; and to take in connection with these transactions substantial commissions and profits. Having once acquired control of an investment company, the group used the funds of this company to acquire control of other investment
companies". Id. at 72. For the most recent developments concerning the activities of
this group, see N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1940, p. 29, col. 4.
164. This was the technique of Mr. Wallace Groves, who "within a year and a half
. . . had acquired control of five investment companies at a nominal cost to himself,
and had sold out his control holdings of the top company of the holding company system for approximately $S,ooo,ooo". REPORT, Part 3, c. II, p. 176.
165. That a fiduciary duty existed was conceded by many sponsors and managers.
REPoRT, Part 3, c. IV, p. 8, n. 13.
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public investors in these transactions. Apparently the insiders were too
much swayed by the opportunity to sell their common stock which had
no asset value, but which brought a considerable premium since it controlled the corporate assets which belonged to the senior security holders.1 16
No investigation was made of the ability, integrity or purpose of the acquiring group; no attempt was made to maintain the investment policy of the
company; no effort was made to secure a similar offer to purchase for the
general investors; and "almost invariably" the sale of control was never
disclosed to the security holders till after the transaction had taken place.
The result was that:
". .. following the undisclosed shift in control of their companies
minority shareholders often found themselves interested in companies
which no longer invested in diversified securities, but which were
associated with the acquiring corporation in obtaining control of other
investment companies. Investment companies which formerly were
not operated under management contracts now were administered
under management contracts by the terms of which the controlling
corporation received an annual compensation based on a percentage
of the assets of the managed company. A stockholder, dissatisfied
with the change in policy, had no alternative but to sell his stock in
the market at prices less than their actual value in assets. And the
acquiring corporation, in the then condition of securities markets, was
usually the only market bidder for his shares. As such sole bidder
the acquiring corporation usually fixed a market price less than the
liquidating value of the security but greater than the existing market
prices of comparable securities. That the market value of their shares
was higher than the market values of comparable securities may have
been an inducement to stockholders of acquired companies to sell
their shares." 167
An essential part of the procedure in acquiring investment companies
was the extensive use of exchange offers of the securities of the acquiring
corporation for the securities of the acquired corporation."' The purchasing group had control of the common as a result of their dealings with
the insiders. But the common stock had no asset value, all equity of the
acquired company belonging to the senior securities. To recoup the premiums paid for the common and to obtain the asset values behind the
preferred, the purchasing group would put into motion an intensive campaign of exchange offers. 169 All independent sources of advice for the
security holders were in effect cut off because the acquiring company offered
commissions and other compensation to all brokers, dealers, bankers, and
the original sponsors, for their recommendation or active solicitation of
exchanges. 70 Sometimes information which was inaccurate or misleading
166. For the great variety of devices used to induce sponsors and managers to
actively support or passively agree to these shifts in control see id. at 77-393.
167. Id. at 13.

168. Atlas Corporation, for example, "made 43 exchange offers for the securities
of 21 investment companies. Similarly, The Equity Corporation made almost So exchange offers for securities of 14 investment companies". Id. at 395, n. 7.
169. "In the investment bankers and security dealers who had transferred control
of their companies an efficient machinery was found for a nation-wide personal solicitation of exchanges since these investment bankers had offices and dealer connections
throughout the United States." Id. at 409.
I7O. "On June 14, 1932, and June 24, 1932, Atlas Corporation addressed letters to

virtually all the known commercial banks, investment bankers and brokers in the United
States, offering to compensate them for their services in procuring exchanges." Id. at
4o6. The Equity Corporation operated in a similar fashion. Id. at 407.

NOTES

was disseminated 171 and, to lend added appeal to the offer, the market
price of the securities was "stabilized". 17 2 The terms of the exchange offer
were within the sole control of the acquiring company. 78
. Having obtained practically all of the outstanding securities of the
acquired company, the purchasing company could then decide on merger,
consolidation, dissolution or the sale of assets, depending on which process
best suited its purposes. 174 In many cases, the acquiring company held
the number of securities required by state law for the approval of one of
these methods. 7 5 In any event, by its superior position the purchasing
upon. Dissenting minority
group could push through any plan it 7fixed
6
shareholders were left virtually helpless.
The proposed legislation' 77 should enact into law the principle that
"the control of an investment company is akin to a power in trust for the
benefit of the company's stockholders." 1' Certainly under no circumstances should directors or managers be permitted to sell the controlling
disclosblock of stock or a management contract without first completely
ing to and securing the consent of the security holders.'179 A full investigation should have to be made of those intending to acquire the company,
and specific safeguards set up to assure maintenance of the investment
policy of the company and that its assets are not dissipated.
Under the usual provisions of general incorporation statutes, where
shifts in control are contemplated, directors of the two companies decide
which, if any, of the available statutory procedures is to be adopted--dissolution, merger, consolidation, sale of assets or recapitalization by charter amendment. Having then worked out the details of the plan to be
followed, they submit it to the security holders for approval. Dissenters,
if they have taken the requisite steps, may, in certain instances, get the
appraisal value of their shares. But the situation contemplated by these
statutes did not exist where a single controlling group was on both sides
of the plan so that arm's length dealing was impossible, where those creating the plan had conflicting interests with the security holders and where
all independent, unbiased judgment was eliminated.
Investment companies should be regulated in this respect in the same
fashion as are banks and insurance companies. The main provision of
this aspect of the legislation should be that the plan put forward would
be subject to the approval of the SEC as well as of the security holders.18
i71. Thus the management performance of the acquiring corporation was exaggerated by salesmen who also represented that the exchange offers had been approved
by the courts. Id. at 410-411.
172. See the discussion of the operations of the Atlas Corporation. Id. at 415, 420

et seq.

173. Id. at 427.
174. Ibid.
175. Id. at 393-395.

176. Id. at 472.
177. The SEC, even where it has the power to require disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 of matters effecting exchange offers, has no complementary power to
judge the fairness of such offers. Similarly most Blue Sky Laws do not empower
local securities commissions to pass on the fairness of exchange offers. Moreover, the
more strict Blue Sky Laws can be avoided by having the exchange offer technically
take place in one of the "liberal" states. All the exchange offers of Atlas Corporation
took place in New Jersey. Id. at 397, n. II.
178. See REPORT, Part 3, c. IV, p. II, n. 2o, discussing Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn, 94
F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
179. Every person holding directly or indirectly more than Io% of any equity secu-

rity must make a statement of his holdings to the SEC, and a monthly report of any
change. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78 (p) (Supp. 1939).
i8o. The merger or consolidation of any bank must usually be approved by the
superintendent of banldng and two-thirds or three-fourths of the shareholders. See, for
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The SEC should act on these plans in the same way it now acts on a
reorganization plan of a public utility holding company under Chapter X
of the Chandler Act and Section ii (f) of the Holding Company Act.'
The ultimate end would be "the fair plan" "8 arrived at by negotiation,
with the important added factor that the approval of a disinterested, unbiased expert would be available and, in fact, necessary. Full disclosure
of all the aspects of the proposal would thus be made to the security
holders.
VII. BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
The last important problem concerns the bankruptcy and reorganization of investment companies. As to this aspect, the SEC should be given
the same statutory powers to examine the affairs of the investment company that the federal government has given the Comptroller of Currency
in relation to federal reserve banks 183 and that the states have given their
superintendents of banking and insurance commissioners in relation to
those other financial institutions.8 4

Reports at periodic intervals during

the year should be made to the SEC, which should also be given the
power to examine under oath officers and directors of the company. In
the event of an impairment in the financial condition of the company, which
is not remedied within a stipulated period of time, the SEC should be able
to step in and take over the operation of the company in the same way
that the superintendent of banking takes over an insolvent bank.
If it proved impossible to restore the company to a sound basis, then
application to the court could be made under Chapter X of the Chandler
Act for the appointment of a disinterested trustee."8 5 Under Section 2o8
the SEC may, with the approval of the judge, and must, if the judge requests, become a party to a proceeding for all purposes except to
appeal and receive compensation. 8 8 Under Section 172 of Chapter X,
the reorganization plan must be referred to the SEC "for examination and report" where the debtor's indebtedness exceeds $3,ooo,o0o.187
If the indebtedness is less than that amount the judge may, nevertheless,
refer the plan to the SEC.'8
In the latter case, it has been the practice
of the SEC to make application for participation "where the face amount
of the debtor's publicly held securities" is more than a quarter of a million
dollars. 89
Thus under the already existing set-up, the SEC has an important
advisory and regulatory role.1 0 Given the added powers suggested to
example, N. Y. BANKING LAW (1937) §§ 487-490. Cf. § 173 of Chapter X, 52 STAT.
891 (1938) ii U. S. C. A. § 573 (1939).
181. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), II U. S. C. A. § 502 (1939) ; 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U.

S. C. A. § 79 (k) (f) (Supp. 1939).
182. Panuch, The S. E. C. and the ChandlerAct (939)
BANKR. REV., ioo, ioi. See also REPORT ON THE STUDY

A3 CoRP. REORG. AND AM.

AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FuNcTIONs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION

COMmITTEEs (1938) Part VII, § IV, p. 198 et seq.
183. 38 STAT. 271 (913), 12 U. S. C. A. §481 (1936).
184. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) C. 20, § 3, C. 66, §24; I MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924)
art. II, §6, art. 48A, §6; 2 MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 167, §2, c. 175, §4; N. Y.
BANKING LAW (1937) §39; N. Y. INS. LAW (1937) §39.
185. For a discussion of the SEC as trustee under the Holding Company Act see
N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1940, § 3, P.I, col. 8. Cf. Securities and Exchange Comfnission v.
United States Realty and Improvement Co., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 143 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
186. 52 STAT. 894 (1938), II U. S. C. A. § 6o8 (1939).
187. 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 572 (1939).

188. Ibid.
189. Panuch, note 182 mpra, at 102.
i9o. This procedure has apparently worked with conspicuous success in the reorganization of Reynolds Investing Company, Panuch, note 182 supra, at lO4.
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cope with the situation confronting the company before it goes into bankruptcy and reorganization, the SEC will be enabled on an even more
extensive scale to protect the public investors.
CONCLUSION

The manifold abuses pervading the investment company industry that
have been uncovered, especially by the SEC's Report, are apt to cause
a somewhat prejudiced view towards the institution itself. The point to
be remembered, however, is that the investment company has never had
a fair opportunity to achieve its purposes. Almost invariably it has
been distorted by other interests. If kept to its appointed task by regulation such as that here suggested, the writer feels that the investment
company would justify its great economic and social possibilities as a vehide for offering an outlet to capital and a channel to supply capital to
industry, diversification of risk to the investor coupled with the further
advantages of constant security analysis and expert independent management. 19' All too often these true "purposes were aspirations rather than
practices." 192 The legislation should make them realities, and the essence
of the proposals suggested is to place the investment company in its rightful position as a financial institution.
E.P.R.

Related Problems in the Assumption of a Mortgage Debt
Throughout American jurisdictions there is great difference of opinion
in the situations discussed below, as to a mortgagee's right to enforce a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor or his grantee who assumed
the mortgage. Any attempt to rationalize all American cases on these
points would seem to be impossible, and this is largely due to the fact that
the law is at present in the process of development. In view of this fact,
then, it may be important to attempt to discern in what direction the trend
is moving and what solution to these problems the law should ultimately
provide.
THE BASIS OF LIABILITY

At common law a mortgagee could not enforce a deficiency judgment
against a purchaser of the mortgaged property who assumed the mortgage,
since he, as mortgagee, was not a party to the contract of assumption. Such
is still the law of England.' In the United States, however, he now has
such a right 2 in some circumstances, but the basis thereof is not everywhere
the same. He was first allowed to recover from the assuming grantee, if
he could do so at all, under the theory of "equitable (quasi) subrogation",
a rule which was the product of two opposing forces. Courts had begun to
recognize the need for allowing certain types of "third party beneficiaries"
to sue on a contract made for their benefit, and yet there was a natural
hesitancy to ignore so "fundamental" a concept as the requirement of
191. GRABHA
192. Shaviro,
at 310-312.

AND DODD, op. cit supra note 92, at 324.
note 2 supra. See also GRauAE AND DODD, op. cit. supra note

92,

I. Since in England no third party for whose "benefit" a contract is made can sue
upon it. Tweddle v. Atldnson, I B. & S. 393 (i86i). 2 WILLISTON, CONrIaMrs (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 360.
:2.Massachusetts may be classed as the single exception. There he can do so, if at
all, only with the grantor's consent. Coffin v. Adams, 131 Mass. 133 (1831).
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"privity". Hence arose this compromise rule, which, be it noted, would
have been equally applicable to any other "creditor beneficiary" contract.
Under this rule, the mortgagee brought his suit against the mortgagor,
who, in relation to the assuming purchaser of the mortgaged property, was
as a surety to his principal debtor. Then, under the equitable rule that a
creditor is entitled to all the securities of the principal debtor which are in
the hands of the surety, the mortgagee succeeded to the assuming grantee's
promise to pay the debt.3 And since all the parties are then before the
court, the assuming grantee's promise will be then and there enforced to
avoid circuity of action. 4
Various other jurisdictions have adopted a more simple rationale. The
mortgagee is allowed to sue the assuming grantee simply as a third party
beneficiary, i. e. one for whose benefit the promise to pay the debt was requested. But here again the rule is subject to variations from state to
state, ranging, for example, from Connecticut where it is sufficient that
the promisee-grantor intend to confer a cause of action upon the mortgagee, 5
to Kansas where the mortgagee may recover under this rule only where
the promise was requested for his "sole and exclusive" benefit. 6
Thus it will be seen that the rules of recovery here are made to depend
on the more general rules of contract-the rights of third parties for whose
benefit the contract was made. Those rules are still in a period of growth,
not only from state to state, but even within a given jurisdiction. 7 As they
change, the corresponding mortgage law likewise changes, but more slowly,
and this is one of the great sources of confusion. New Jersey, for example,
still retains the subrogation theory in its mortgage law 8 though third
party beneficiary recovery is permitted by statute.9 New York, still employing the subrogation theory, also allows recovery under the beneficiary
theory, where the mortgagee may be regarded as a creditor.10 Each one
of the steps in the growth of the beneficiary rule is marked in mortgage
law. Minnesota at one time found that this situation gave rise to a trust,"
Rhode Island once held that the mortgagee could recover under a theory
of novation,' 2 both of which devices were once common in contract law to
permit recovery where the rule of "third party beneficiaries" had not yet
been established.
It is of course difficult to discuss the relative merits of these two
theories, "subrogation" and "beneficiary", apart from their application to
3. "In short, if one person agrees with another to be primarily liable for a debt due
from that other to a third person, so that as between the parties to the agreement the
first is the principal and the second the surety, the creditor of such surety is entitled, in
equity, to be substituted in his place for the purpose of compelling such principal to pay
the debt." Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o, 623 (1890).
4. Osborne v. Cabell, 77 Va. 462 (1883).
5. Schneider v. Ferrigno, iio Conn. 86, 147 Atl. 303 (1929).
6. Morris v. Mix, 4 Kan. App. 654, 46 Pac. 58 (1896) semble.
7. Such is the case even in New York. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936)
§368. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 12o N. E. 639 (1918) ; (1918) 27 YALE L. 3.
563; (1919) 17 MICH. L. REV. 342.
8. See note 9 infra.
.9. N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) 2: 26-3.6, passed in 19o3 and allowing a beneficiary to
sue in any court. Yet in Feitlinger and Federal Trust Co. v. Heller, 112 N. J. Eq. 2o9,
164 Atl. 6 (1933) a mortgagee was denied equitable relief, the decision being based on
the relationship of the parties in the eyes of equity.
IO.Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877).
Ii. Follansbee v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882 (1881).
12. Urquhart v. Brayton, 12 R. I. 169 (1878); Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Goff,
13 R. I. 516 (1882). Today both Rhode Island and Minnesota follow the beneficiary
doctrine. Semble. Hamilton Co. v. Rosen, 58 R. I. 35, I9I Atl. 255 (I937) ; Becker v.
Nelson, 164 Minn. 367, 205 N. W. 262 (1925).
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specific cases, yet there is this much to be said: there appears to be no
good reason why the contract whereby a grantee assumes a mortgage
should be treated differently from any other contract made for the benefit
of a third person, notwithstanding historical precedent to the contrary,"8
and since the right of a "third party beneficiary" to sue has become so well
established in American contract law, the need for such a cumbersome and
comparatively unrealistic theory as that of "equitable subrogation" should
hardly be considered pressing.
THE EFFECT OF THE GRANTOR's NoN-LIABILITY

It is at once apparent that where one who purchased the mortgaged
property without assuming the mortgage conveys to one who covenants
to assume it, the latter's liability to the mortgagee can be made to depend
on the theoretical basis of mortgagee's rights discussed above. If the
jurisdiction in which the problem arises is committed to the subrogation
doctrine, the mortgagee cannot recover, since the original mortgagor has
no claim upon his own non-assuming grantee and hence none against the
last and assuming grantee. There is no promise from the first grantee
to which the mortgagee can be "subrogated".' 4 As is commonly said, the
chain of liability has been broken. On the other hand, if recovery by a
third party beneficiary is permitted generally, the mortgagee may or may
not be able to recover, depending upon what particular variation of that
doctrine is in vogue. Where, as in Kansas, 5 West Virginia' 6 or Missouri 17 only a "sole and exclusive" donee beneficiary is allowed to sue, the
mortgagee's action will almost always fail. On the other hand, where a
donee is regarded merely as one upon whom the promisee intended to
confer a right of action, he would recover.' 8 A like distinction exists with
respect to a creditor beneficiary's right to sue. Ordinarily, under this
concept, the mortgagee could not recover since the promisee, the first
grantee, owed him no 9debt, but as the Restatement of Contracts defines a
"creditor beneficiary", the mortgagee might or might not recover, depending upon whether or not the promisee "supposed" that he owed the
mortgagee a debt. Of course where both the promisor and the promisee
mistakenly believed that the promisee owed the mortgagee a debt, the contract could be reformed, 20 but this is attended with considerable practical
difficulties. Of the five possible rules, then, that of the subrogation doctrine
and the four of the beneficiary theory, three prevent recovery and two
may permit it. But the law of beneficiaries being still in process of
growth,' 2 it might be well to determine what the rule should be in this
13. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 384. By way of further illustration of the
changing law on this subject, see Berick, PersonalLiability for Deficiency in Mortgage
Foreclosures (934) 8 U. oF CIN. L. Rv. 103, dealing with the law of Ohio, and Note
(939) 25 VA. L. Rv. 993, concerning the law in Virginia.
14. Wise v. Fuller, 29 N. J. Eq. 257 (1878).
15. Morris v. Mix, 4 Kan. App. 654, 46 Pac. 58 (1896). And Colorado Savings
Bank v. Bales, ioi Kan. ioo, I65 Pac. 843 (1917) reaches the same result.
z6. W. VA. CODE ANN. (1937) § 5494, which permits one not a party to the contract to sue upon it only when made for his "sole" benefit.
17. Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co., 119 Mo. 304, 24 S. W. 784 (1893) ; Hicks v.
Hamilton, I44 Mo. 495, 46 S. W. 432 (1898).
i8. Schneider v. Ferrigno, I1o Conn. 86, i47 Atl. 3o3 (1929).
i9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 133, ib.
2o. Cushing v. Newbern, 75 Okla. 258, 183 Pac. 409 (1919).
21. As intimated above, it is not always clear just where a given jurisdiction stands

today. Compare, for example, Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 6io (i8go) (leading case
on subrogation theory) and Bradbury v. Carter, 291 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923)
(holding that a mortgagee may recover from an assuming grantee, though the latter's
grantor was not liable).
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particular situation, rather than what it should be for all conceivable
contracts.
Assuming, then, that there has not been a mutual mistake of fact,
either as to the non-assuming grantee's liability, or the presence of the
assumption clause in the contract, what factors should be controlling?
Apparently the interests of the mortgagee should be given no weight. In
the first place, he already has the security of the land, the mortgagor's
personal liability for a deficiency and likewise the personal liability of any
other assuming grantees prior to the non-assuming grantee. And most
important of all, he has given no consideration for the last and assuming
grantee's promise. On the other hand, it must be noted that the non-assuming grantee has given consideration for all of the assuming grantee's promises, of which this is one. And another possibly important factor is that
although he has given consideration for this particular promise, he will
be unable to recover for its breach since he will be unable to show damage.2 2 Now it is commonly said that since by hypothesis the non-assuming
grantee is not liable to the mortgagee for a deficiency, he has no interest
in enforcing the promise of his own grantee to assume. 3 While this may
be the usual case, it is by no means necessarily true. It is certainly possible that he intend to provide the mortgagee with additional security for
reasons of his own; or again, where he is doubtful as to his own liability
to the mortgagee by reason of extrinsic circumstances which might well
give rise to a similar doubt on the part of the mortgagee, he is very much
interested in making the assuming grantee liable since he might thereby
avoid litigation with the mortgagee, which, even though it resolve the
doubt in his favor, would be costly in both time and money.
The definition of the Restatement of Contracts of creditor 24 and
donee 25 beneficiaries, would permit the mortgagee's recovery in any of
these situations, and is for that reason submitted to be the best of the
present rules. However, it might possibly permit recovery where the
non-assuming grantee is not at all interested in the enforcement of the
promise, as for example, where he inserted the assumption clause under a
"supposition" 28 of liability which he is now satisfied does not exist.
In
view of the fact, as suggested above, that it is his interests rather than
those of the mortgagee which should be considered, it would seem that in
such a situation the mortgagee should not be allowed to recover. While
this difficulty could no doubt be met by applying the spirit rather than the
letter of the Restatement, the rule that would most neatly fit the facts might
be one similar to that appearing in Massachusetts, 27 that one not a party to
the contract of assumption in this situation might sue upon it only with
the consent of the promisee. However that may be, there is no doubt that,
with the trend in the law toward a general acceptance of the third party
beneficiary rules of recovery, the law will generally become settled affirmatively at least, that where the non-assuming grantee has any discernable
interest in enforcing the promise, the mortgagee will be allowed to recover.
22. To this effect, see Croker v. N. Y. Trust Co., 245 Nj Y. 17, 156 N. E. 8r
(1927) ; (1927) 41 HARV. L. REv. 97. However, though such is the generally accepted
dogma, see 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 359, n. I.
23. Morris v. Mix, 4 Kan. App. 654, 664, 46 Pac. 58, 61 (1896).

24. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
25. Id. at § 133, Ia.

(1932)

§ 133, ib.

26. The term employed in the RESTATEmENT, § 133, ib.
27. Coffin v. Adams, 131 Mass. 133 (I88I), but not applied to the instant situation:
Mellon v. Whipple, 67 Mass. 317 (1854).

NOTES
DISCHARGE OF THE MORTGAGOR BY RELEASE OF His GRANTEE

The importance of the basis upon which the mortgagee sues is most
apparent in the situation discussed above, but it has a further bearing in
the problem of the mortgagor's liability where the mortgagee has given
the assuming grantee a release or extension of time. Here again the
courts are divided, and, broadly viewed, the decisions are based upon one
of two theories. The first is to the effect that since the mortgagor and his
grantee stand, as between themselves, in the relationship of principal and
surety, a release of the grantee-principal discharges the surety.2 8 The
other provides that although the parties may be as principal and surety to
each other, nevertheless they are both principal debtors as to the mortgagee, who may therefore treat one as he will without affecting the liability of the other.29 Thus the difference centers about the concept of
"suretyship", and the applicability of a rule of discharge of suretyship law
that has not escaped criticism even in the field from which it was drawn.30
Moreover, the analogy is not perfect, since, for example, in the normal
transaction giving rise to a surety relationship, the surety makes himself
liable for the debt of another, whereas in the mortgage situation, the
"surety" is liable for a debt of his own. Again, where release is permitted
under the doctrine of suretyship, it is held that it is the mortgagee's dealing with the grantee which constitutes an acceptance on his part of the
suretyship relation; but as has often been pointed out, this is to make the
mortgagor a surety and discharge him as such in one and the same act.
It might well be expected that a jurisdiction permitting the mortgagee
to sue the grantee only under the doctrine of equitable subrogation would
not permit a discharge in this situation on the grounds that the mortgagee's rights against the grantee are purely derivative, and prior to an
action by the mortgagee against the mortgagor there is no duty running
from the grantee to the mortgagee which the mortgagee could vaive.31
Such, however, is not the case.32 Again, in jurisdictions employing the
beneficiary doctrine, the mortgagee's right against both parties is contractual and direct, and hence dealings between the mortgagee and one of
the promisors should have no effect on the liability of the other; but here
33
too the courts do not necessarily carry their rule to its logical conclusion,
giving more attention to thd applicability of the suretyship analogy than to
the original basis of liability.
The analogy, of course, should not be permitted to obscure the problem
it was designed to solve, and the factual situation to which this analogy to
suretyship is applied deserves careful consideration. To say that the
parties to the contract of conveyance stand in the relationship of surety
and principal, is only another way of saying that the grantor has promised
the mortgagee that he will pay the debt, and the grantee has promised the
grantor as part payment for the conveyed land, that he will pay off the
28. Grace v. Wilson, 139 Misc. 757, 250 N. Y. Supp. 212 (i93i); and see cases
collected in 41 A. L. R. 272.
29. Iowa Title and Loan Co. v. Cork Bros., 209 Ia. i69, 224 N. W. 774 (1929);
and see cases collected in 41 A. L. R. 285.
3o. Note (937) 4 U. OF Cn'. L. R v. 469 and citations therein.
31. See Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 287, igo (1892), which
apparently recognizes this.
32. "Equitable subrogation" jurisdictions allowing discharge by extension: Herd
v. Tuohy, I33 Cal. 55, 65 Pac. 139 (I9oi) ; Codman v. Deland, 231 Mass. 344, 121 N.
E. i4 (i9r8) ; Reeves v. Cordes et al., io8 N. J. Eq. 469, 155 Atl. 547 (i93i).
33. Jurisdictions which employ the beneficiary theory yet allow discharge of the
grantor: Binga v. Bell, 259 Ill. App. 361 (i93o) ; Harris v. Atchison, 183 Minn. 292,
N. W. 458 (1931) ; Fischer v. Boller, 227 Mo. App. 52, 51 S. W. (2d) 141 (1932).
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same amount. Thus there are two separate promises, each for consideration, to pay the sum owed, and the mortgagee may enforce either of them.
Now the suretyship rule of discharge of the grantor by extension of time
to the grantee was introduced into mortgage law to protect the grantor
who was injured by such action on the part of the mortgagee.3 4 It should
never be permitted, therefore, to operate so as to release one who has
promised to pay the debt and has not been injured by the release. 35 In
other words, the extent of the grantor's release should depend simply on
the extent of his actual injury caused directly by the release or extension. 0
The apparent hardship of such a rule arises where the grantor has come
to believe from the mortgagee's dealings with the grantee that the mortgagee no longer looks to the grantor for payment. Yet practically, such an
attitude is not justifiable and the fact that the grantor
has given a binding
37
promise to pay the debt is the controlling factor.
What the grantor's injury will be in any given case, is difficult to
predict. Ordinarily where there has been an extension of time during
which the value of the land declines, the grantor has been injured to the
extent of the difference in the value of the land at the time the debt was
originally due and its worth at the end of the extension period, since even
though the grantor performed his promise to pay and obtained an assignment of the mortgage, he could not foreclose until the expiration of the
extension period. But the rule, satisfactory enough in this situation, that
the grantor is discharged to the amount of the land's value at the date the
extension period begins, is no magic formula invariably producing the
perfect solution. By way of illustration, suppose the mortgagee gives the
assuming grantee an extension at the time the debt is due, the grantee
then owning other property worth the full amount of the debt. At the
end of the extension period, the grantee being insolvent, the mortgagee
forecloses and the mortgaged property brings only 70 per cent. of the
amount of the debt. Now where the grantor could have obtained specific
performance of the grantee's promise to pay the debt3 18 in the contract of
assumption, it is plain that the grantor's loss of 30 per cent. of the amount
of the debt by way of the deficiency he will be compelled to pay has not
been caused by the mortgagee's extension, but by his own failure to compel
the grantee to perform,, due in turn to indifference or carelessness as to
his own promise to the mortgagee to repay. In such circumstances it
would appear that there should be no discharge whatever. 39
In view, then, of the reason for the rule of "discharge by release or
extension", it is submitted that what the extent of the discharge will be
34. Note (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 469, 470.
35. The rule is discussed in CARDOZo, THE NATURE
(1921)

OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS

152.

36. Such is the rule for "compensated sureties" [ARANT ON SURErYSHIP (1931)

299] within which class the grantor here might well be classified.
37. As in Morganroth v. Pink, 227 Ill. App. 244 (1922).
38. Here, however, the courts may distinguish between a contract in which the

grantee merely assumes and one in which he assumes and promises to pay the debt.
Woodward v. Molander, 92 Colo. 551, 22 P. (2d) 622 (933), and Woodruff v. Germansky, 233 N. Y. 365, 135 N. E. 6oi (1922), saying that where the grantee merely
assumes, the relationship of surety and principal is established between the parties and
therefore the grantor cannot obtain specific performance. Thus the surety analogy,
designed originally for the grantor's protection, is made to operate to his possible injury. As to the adequacy of the remedy at law, see citations in note 22 supra.
39. And a similar rationale was adopted in Iowa Title and Loan Co. v. Clark Bros.,
209 Ia. 169, 224 N. W. 774 (1929) on the ground that the mortgagor could have
avoided such loss by paying the debt, obtaining the mortgage and foreclosing immediately in spite of the extension agreement, since the latter did not affect the grantee's
covenant with the grantor.
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should depend on the circumstances of the specific case, and that the indiscriminate application of any preconceived rule of thumb, that "extension of
time to the principal debtor discharges the surety in full", ". . . to the
extent of the value of the land", or ". . . not at all", will fail to approxi-

mate a fair and conscionable settlement.
THE SAME

SITUATIONS IN

PENNSYLVANIA

The rights of a third person to sue upon a contract made for his
benefit were as obscure and ill-defined in early Pennsylvania law as in
that of most other jurisdictions. One of the earliest of such cases was
Blymire v. Boistle 40 which held that while one for whose benefit a contract
was made might sue upon it, yet where the promisee owed the third person
a duty which the promise in question was designed to fulfill, the contract
could not be regarded as made for the third person's "benefit". Thus,
while New York would allow recovery by a creditor beneficiary but not a
donee, 41 with this decision Pennsylvania took the opposite position. Nevertheless the Blymire decision was not consistently followed, for in subsequent cases the courts recognized the right of a mortgagee to bring an
action of assumpsit against the assuming grantee on the latter's contract
with the grantor.4 2 Thus it appears that whatever may have been the
state of the broader contract rule,43 the rights of a beneficiary of a contract
to assume a mortgage debt were not then dependent upon any theory of
equitable subrogation.
In 1878 the legislature enacted the following: "A grantee of real
estate which is subject to ground rent or bound by mortgage or other
encumbrance, shall not be personally liable for the payment of such ground
rent, mortgage or other encumbrance, unless he shall, by an agreement in
writing, have expressly assumed a personal liability therefor, or there shall
be express words in the deed of conveyance stating that the grant is made
on condition of the grantee assuming such personal liability: Provided,
That the use of the words 'under and subject to the payment of such ground
rent, mortgage or other encumbrance', shall not alone be so construed as to
make such grantee personally liable as aforesaid.
"The right to enforce such personal liability shall not inure to any
person other than the person with whom such an agreement is made, nor
shall such personal liability continue after the said grantee has bona fide
parted with the encumbered property, unless he shall have expressly
assumed such continuing liability." 44
The effect of this statute was not what might have been expected.
Under numerous interpretations thereof, the law today appears to be as
follows. The statute is held to have no application in actions by the
grantor against the grantee. 45 Accordingly, when the grantee takes "under
and subject to" he thereby promises to indemnify the grantor against the
latter's actual loss, 48 and the grantee's liability will not necessarily be
limited to the value of the land, but is coextensive with the mortgage
debt. 47 Be it noted, however, that here the grantor cannot enforce the
4o. 6 Watts

182 (Pa. 1837).
41. Simpson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 (1877).
42. Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa. 20o (z855) ; Lennig's Estate, 52 Pa. 135 (866) ; Merriman v. Moore, go Pa. 78 (,879).
43. For an analysis of both early and modern law, see Corbin, The Law of Third
Party Beneficiariesin Pennsylvania (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. i.
44. PA. STAT. AxN.

(Purdon, 1930) tit. 21, §§ 655, 656.

45. Lennox v. Brower, 16o Pa. 191, 28 Atl. 839 (1894).
46. Falkner v. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, 83 Atl. 827 (1912).
47. May's Estate, 218 Pa. 64, 67 Atl. 820 (1907).
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grantee's promise to indemnify until he has first paid the debt or deficiency
himself. 48 Where, however, the purchaser takes the land and expressly
assumes the mortgage, his promise is construed as one to indemnify
against liability, 49 the difference being that the grantor can enforce this
promise before he himself has suffered any loss,50 and may, if he chooses,
do so by an action in his own name to the use of the mortgagee, 51 the
effect of which is to obtain specific performance of the grantee's promise 52;
and finally, he may enforce the grantee's promise even though the latter has
53
reconveyed the property without expressly assuming a continuing liability.
There have been conflicting opinions as to the effect this enactment
had on the rights of the mortgagee, but the law is probably settled today
that where the grantee has assumed the mortgage, the mortgagee still has
means of enforcing the assuming grantee's promise, and this by an action
to use in the grantor's name and with his consent. 54 And in Frey v. United
Traction Co. where the mortgagee brought the action in his own name, it
was held that this was a mere defect in procedure and that amendment
would be permitted then and there and the action allowed. 55 He has never,
as yet, been permitted to recover from an assuming grantee who has in
turn conveyed the mortgaged premises without expressly assuming continuing liability,56 but it is difficult to see why an action to use would not
be equally effective here. 57 Apart from that limitation, however, the Act
of 1878 has been largely circumvented, and since the case of Fair Oaks B.
& L. Assn, 8 the mortgagee's rights differ little if at all from those of any
creditor beneficiary.
Whether or not the statute was given the effect intended by the legislature seems of little importance today. The above rules have grown up
over a period of almost 62 years and are not likely to be abjured. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that the "construction" of the statute,
while curious, is by no means undesirable, in the light of its effect on
several correlative problems.
Under this interpretation of the statute, the right of a mortgagee to
sue on the contract of indemnity is in all respects save one, that of a third
party beneficiary and as indicated above, this is just as it should be. The
one possible difference would seem to lie in the requirement in Pennsylvania that the mortgagee maintaining an action to use in the grantor's
name, do so with his consent.59 This point was not mentioned in either
48. Faulkner v. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, 83 Atl. 827 (1912).
49. Ruzyc v. Brown, 320 Pa. 213, I81 Atl. 783 (1935).
5o. McAbee v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94, 45 Atl. 1093 (I899) ; Ruzyc v. Brown, 320 Pa.
213, 181 At. 783 (935).
5I. Lennox v. Brower, i6o Pa. 191, 28 Atl. 839 (1894), approved as "the better
practice" in Fair( Oaks B. & L. Ass'n v. Kahler, 320 Pa. 245, 252, I81 Atl. 779, 781
(1935); and to the same effect: Gregg v. Allen, 130 Pa. 6ii, i8 Atl. 1020 (18go).
The question was conclusively settled in Ruzyc v. Brown, 32oQ Pa. 213, 18i Ati. 783
(935).
52. Rules 2OOl et seq. of the new Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure, Prosecution of
Actions by Real Parties in Interest, 332 Pa. lxiii (1939), became effective September
4, 1939. What, if any, effect they will have in the instant situation, this note does not
attempt to discuss. They will not, of course, affect any "substantive" rights.
53. Krker v. Wylie, 207 Pa. 511, 56 Atl. 1o74 (19o4).
54. See Fisler v. Reach, 202 Pa. 74, 77, 5I Atl. 599, 6oo (i9o2) ; Smith v. Danielson, 45 Pa. Super. 125 (I9II) ; 2 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE (1935) 456.
55. 320 Pa. 196, 18I Atl. 775 (1935).
56. Sloan v. Klein, 230 Pa. 132, 79 Atl. 403 (191o).
57. (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. g1o, n. 7.
58. Fair Oaks B. & L. Ass'n v. Kahler, 320 Pa. 245, 181 Atl. 779 (I935), (1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 9O9.
59. Note 54 supra.
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the Frey or the Fair Oaks cases, but in all probability the court in the
latter case would have dispensed with such requirement, since there the
application of the rule would have made little if any difference. But it is
to be hoped that the rule will not now be ignored entirely. As has been
indicated above, the rules of the Restatement of Contracts with regard to
third party beneficiaries (now a part of the law of Pennsylvania 60) provide
the best solution to the problem of the liability of an assuming grantee to
his mortgagee when the grantor was not liable, save possibly where the
Restatement would allow the mortgagee's recovery when the grantor had
no interest therein. That, however, would not occur in Pennsylvania under
the rule that the mortgagee, suing to use in the grantor's name, can do so
only with the latter's consent. 61 This, then, would appear to be one of the
unlooked-for advantages of the Act of 1878 and its operation,6 2 and it
might well be retained by the simple method of requiring a mortgagee who
sues an assuming grantee as a donee beneficiary to comply with the old
rule of consent.
The Act of 1878 has further effect in another unexpected quarter.
Where a mortgagor claims a discharge of liability for the mortgage debt
on the grounds that the grantee was given an extension of time or release,
the Pennsylvania courts have met the question realistically and with a
minimum of dogma. Though references to "surety relationship" are not
uncommon, it is perfectly plain that the cases turn upon the simple question of whether or not the mortgagee's grant of release or extension was
the actual cause of loss to the mortgagor. 3 This being the real test, no
Pennsylvania cases have allowed discharge, and it is difficult to suppose a
situation in which they would do so. By the Act of April 28, 1903, a
mortgagor may, by payment of the balance due to the mortgagee, compel
an assignment of the mortgage to himself, 64 and the courts have maintained,
though not in a square holding, that he can "thereafter foreclose as though
the extension were not in existence". 5 But further, as was seen above,
the Pennsylvania mortgagor can, at the time the debt is due, maintain an
action in his own name to the use of the mortgagee to compel the grantee's
performance of his promise of assumption.66 It is clear enough then, that
6o. Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co., 332 Pa. 183, 167 At. 793
322 Pa. 429, 185 Ati. 198 (936).
61. See note 52 supra.
62. Whether the assuming grantee is liable to the mortgagee when the grantor was
not, has been appealed only once, apparently, in Pennsylvania. Merriman v. Moore, 90
Pa. 78 (I879), applying the law as before the Act of 1878. Recovery was allowed the
mortgagee on the ground that he was a beneficiary and as such might sue on the assumption contract. Subsequent cases have frequently cited it with approval, but while
he would still be allowed to sue, apparently, under the Act of 3878 as applied by the
courts he would be obliged to sue in the grantor's name and obtain his consent unless the
Fair Oaks B. & L. As'n case be taken to have dispensed with such requirements.
The manner in which the purchaser of land might properly stipulate in the contract
of conveyance that he was not to be liable to pay out money in any event is suggested
in Ledwith, The Personal Liability of the Grantee of Mortgaged Property (1933) PA.
BAR Ass'N Q. 117.
63. Kiedaisch v. Elkins Park Nat. Bank, 325 Pa. 241, 189 Atl. 303 (1937) ; Willoe's Estate, 58 Pa. Super. 159 (1914) ; Joyce v. Hawtoff, 135 Pa. Super. 30, 4 A. (2d)
599 (1938) ; York Trust Co. v. Haugh, 20 Pa. D. & C. 338 (933).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 21, §§ 735-738.
65. Willocl's Estate, 58 Pa. Super. 159, 168 (1914), quoted with approval in the
Joyce and Kiedaisch cases cited supra note 63.
66. Note 51 supra. This right corresponds to a surety's right to exoneration, which
is enforceable only in equity. ARANT 01 SUErySHIp (393) 318. The right to bring
such an action at law may be an unconscious adaptation of an equitable rule by the
Pennsylvania law courts, as was very common during the period when courts of equity
did not exist in Pennsylvania.
(1933); McClelland v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
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if he fails to exercise either of these rights, any loss he may suffer by
reason of a subsequent decline in the value of the property is not the result
of the extension, but of his own inaction in failing to perform his own
promise. That being so, he is hardly entitled to discharge.
Perhaps almost as much by accident as design, then, Pennsylvania
has arrived at what are probably the best possible solutions to the related
problems herein reviewed. Its rule of the rights of the mortgagee to sue
upon the contract of assumption no longer differs from the modem rule of
contract beneficiaries save in one particular that may well prove advantageous, and both these and the rules pertaining to "release by discharge
or extension" are admirably unhampered by unserviceable dogma. In view
of the fact that the similar law of other jurisdictions is still changing, it
may be that in time the results, at least, now reached in this jurisdiction,
will be attained more generally in others.
J. R. McC.

